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Articles
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?*
Mark A. Lemley** & Philip J. Weiser***
The foundational notion of property law is that "the right to exclude" is
the essence of a true property right.' Using the classic property lens, the
appropriate relief for trespass is thus an injunction barring the use of the
property at issue. Indeed, the correlation is so strong that law and economics
scholars call injunctive relief a "property rule."2 By contrast, the founding
vision of intellectual property (IP) viewed owners of governmentally con-
ferred rights-in patent and copyright-as the beneficiaries of a government
license and as entitled only to remedies sufficient to encourage innovation.3
Over the last several decades, however, more and more courts and commen-
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Jane Thompson for her terrific research librarian support.
** William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP.
*** Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado.
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this case, we hold that the
'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within
this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."); Richard A.
Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
21, 22 (1997) ("[lIt is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the fight to exclude is
rejected."); cf Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L.
REv. 371, 417-18 (2003) (arguing that property should include affirmative rights to develop, not
just rights to exclude).
2. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972). The concept of a "property
rule" does not means that the only or necessarily appropriate property law remedy is an injunction,
but merely that injunctions are the quintessential response to trespass claims.
3. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904) (suggesting a leaky
system of patent rights that would allow "ideas [to] freely spread from one to another over the
globe"). But cf Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?:
Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892062.
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tators have sought to align the rights of IP holders with those of real property
owners, arguing for pervasive use of property rules and limited uses of
"liability rules" (which allow access at a price set by a court or agency).4
Whether this trend is managed sensibly will greatly influence how innovation
develops and whether the Internet will remain as a platform for innovation
and economic growth.
In this Article, we focus on an unappreciated and significant aspect of
the debate over property rules in the technology law context. In particular,
we argue that the classic justification for legal entitlements protected by a
property rule depends on the ability to define and enforce property rights
effectively. In the case of many technology markets, the inability to tailor
injunctive relief so that it protects only the underlying right rather than also
enjoining noninfringing conduct provides a powerful basis for using a liabil-
ity rule instead of a property rule. Where injunctive relief cannot be confined
to protecting the underlying right, the availability of such relief can give rise
to a "holdup strategy," 5 whereby a firm threatens or uses litigation to obtain a
settlement significantly in excess of any harm it suffers. In short, where in-
junctions cannot be well tailored to the scope of the property right at issue
but necessarily restrain the use of property not owned by the plaintiff, those
consequences can overwhelm the benefits of property rules in enforcing legal
rights.
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,6 the Supreme Court confronted
the issue of strategic patent litigation in technology markets and set forth the
terms for the coming debate over whether patent law should provide injunc-
tive relief in the vast majority of cases. In eBay, the Court skirted the
ultimate question, but a pair of dueling concurrences-by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy-clashed over whether there are certain types
of cases for which injunctive relief is not appropriate.' In our view, there are
a number of cases arising under patent law that should not qualify for injunc-
tive relief, including possibly the eBay case itself, in which a firm not
practicing a patent sought to use the threat of an injunction as a strategic tool
4. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2667 (1994) ("All familiar with the IPR field recognize the strong presumption in
favor of injunctions."). By no means do we mean to suggest that this alignment is either appropriate
or completely accepted. See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Dyk, J., concurring) (restating the court's holding that patent rights are created by federal
statute and the congressional limitation of those rights do not give rise to a takings claim).
5. As we discuss, a holdup strategy facilitated by the threat of injunctive relief with a property
right of uncertain scope is distinct from, and even more insidious than, the "holdout strategy"
encountered in real property and addressed by eminent domain. See infra notes 17-25 and
accompanying text.
6. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
7. Compare id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), with id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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to demand extra licensing fees.8 Moreover, we identify three other important
circumstances in Internet-related markets-one involving copyright claims
against search engines, 9 a second involving injunctions with international
scope, and a third involving the regulation of radio spectrum-that fit within
our previously unappreciated rationale for liability rules. The unifying theme
of all these cases is that courts cannot easily tailor injunctions to forbid only
the prohibited conduct. In these situations, injunctive relief can systemati-
cally overcompensate plaintiffs and overdeter defendants, with significant
negative consequences for innovation and economic growth. Stated simply,
where property rules have pernicious consequences, liability rules look better
by comparison.
The case for a liability rule raises, in turn, the question of whether a
court or agency should superintend such a regime. In a number of cases
courts can do so, but we believe that agencies can play a constructive role
where circumstances make it difficult for a court to develop or administer an
effective regime. Unfortunately, scholars have generally failed to recognize
and appreciate the different institutional strategies and tradeoffs inherent in
adopting a liability rule superintended by an agency versus a court or a pri-
vately ordered solution. The need for a critical investigation of such
strategies is particularly important as Congress is now beginning to revisit
and reconsider the use of compulsory licensing systems. 0
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I evaluates the relevant law and
economics literature, explaining the classic justification for employing a
property rule or a liability rule. Part II explains the problem we identify with
property rules that are not well tailored to the plaintiff's rights. Part III offers
four real-world examples in which property rules create these negative
collateral consequences. Part IV then outlines the critical considerations for
whether a liability rule is appropriate in lieu of a property rule. Finally, Part
V discusses the use of compulsory licenses, setting forth several criteria for
them to function effectively, and evaluates the relative institutional compe-
tence of agencies, courts, and private organizations in administering a
liability rule.
8. See id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Brief for 52 Intellectual Property
Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130),
2006 WL 1785363.
9. See generally Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
10. See, e.g., Copyright Modernization Act of 2006, H.R. 6052, 109th Cong. § 102 (as
introduced in the House, Sept. 12, 2006) (providing a statutory rule to govern compulsory licensing
of digitally delivered music).
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I. The Uses and Abuses of Epstein's Law
A. Property Rules and Liability Rules
Different legal entitlements are enforced in different ways.
Traditionally, rights such as the ownership of real property are generally
protected by injunctions, while tort and contract rights are enforced by means
of compensatory damages. As famously explained by Calabresi and
Melamed, these different remedial options represent alternatives for enforc-
ing a legal entitlement-a property rule provides for an injunction and a
liability rule provides for nonconsensual access in return for a payment of
money damages." Though Calabresi and Melamed do not discuss it directly,
there is also a third option-a rule of no liability, or what might be termed a
"zero-price" liability rule. In the property framework, we might think of
such a rule as a commons or "open access" regime.
The conventional approach that emerged from Calabresi and Melamed's
classic article is that courts should rely on liability rules when transaction
costs are sufficiently high that the relevant parties will not be able to reach a
consensual arrangement for access to the resource in question. 12 This ap-
proach reflects the essential insight of the Coase Theorem-that transaction
costs often dictate whether parties will reach an efficient outcome through
bargaining over property rights. 13 As Coase explained, if transaction costs
are low, the parties themselves will reach an efficient outcome through bar-
gaining over the property right in question. By contrast, where such
bargaining is unlikely to take place, a liability rule can ensure that the law
reaches an efficient outcome even in the absence of bargaining.'
4
Neither Coase nor Calabresi and Melamed catalogued the nature of
transaction costs, but a cottage industry known as "transaction cost
economics" has emerged to examine such issues."' What Calabresi and
Melamed categorize generally as "transactions costs" actually encompasses
11. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1092 ("Whenever someone may destroy the initial
entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected
by a liability rule.").
12. Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706 n.9 (1996) ("[L]egal scholars have interpreted Calabresi and
Melamed to be saying that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs are low.");
James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 451 (1995) (deeming a "virtual doctrine" the principle that "[w]hen
transaction costs are low, use property rules; when transaction costs are high, use liability rules");
Merges, supra note 4, at 2655 ("Ever since Calabresi and Melamed, transaction costs have
dominated the choice of the proper entitlement rule, with a liability rule being the entitlement of
choice when transaction costs are high.").
13. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
14. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1119.
15. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234, 246-47 (1979) (discussing, inter alia, the
centrality of transaction costs to the study of economics and the "critical dimensions" for
characterizing transactions).
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two different types of costs: (1) the difficulty and expense of having to nego-
tiate multiple deals; and (2) the risk that some sellers will engage in strategic
behavior to try to increase their share of the rents. An example of the latter
that Calabresi and Melamed discussed was the use of a "holdout strategy.'
' 6
In particular, they explained that in some cases a firm would turn down a
profitable offer for their property in an effort to capture a disproportionate
share of the "economic rents" created by the deal. For example, in the
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co.17 case discussed by
Calabresi and Melamed, the court confronted a claim by owners of land
worth $1,000 that a successful mining operation (which provided significant
tax revenue to the town and jobs to its citizens) should be enjoined as violat-
ing their property rights. 18 Because the award of such an injunction would
enable the landowners to engage in a holdout strategy that would potentially
benefit them at a great expense to society, the court declined to impose the
requested injunction. 19
Scholars following Calabresi and Melamed generally cite transaction
costs as the justification for compulsory licenses.20  The strategic use of
injunctive relief is not an ordinary type of transaction cost, but rather reflects
the fact that certain conditions-including legal uncertainty-can increase
the value of an entitlement and make a holdout strategy rational. Notably,
the ability to threaten a firm with an injunction stems not only from the
recognition of a legal entitlement, but also from the choice of a property rule
to enforce that right. That choice can, in certain instances, create
"misallocation costs" (where one party gets far more than it deserves) and
impose significant social welfare costs by restricting otherwise lawful
conduct, therefore discouraging innovation by defendants and those who fear
they may become defendants.
Both as to compulsory licenses and other forms of liability rules, the
law and economics literature offers two broad arguments in favor of property
rules. First, proponents of property rules question whether courts can effec-
tively identify holdup situations justifying the use of liability rules.2 '
Second, even if courts can identify true holdup scenarios, property rule advo-
cates maintain that courts are ill-suited to develop the appropriate license fee
to make a liability rule work.22 Specifically, the objection is not just that
courts will not identify damages accurately but that the deviation will be
systematic in one direction. As Richard Epstein puts it, the argument is that
16. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1106-07.
17. 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
18. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1120 n.60.
19. Madison, 83 S.W. at 666-67.
20. See Merges, supra note 4, at 2669 (noting that the "conventional justification [for]
compulsory licensing provisions [relies] on the basis of transaction costs").
21. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2093, 2099 (1997).
22. Id. at 2093.
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"[t]he risk of undercompensation in such situations is pervasive," 23 thereby
undermining investment incentives. As a shorthand, we call this "Epstein's
Law."
Epstein's Law holds that would-be purchasers of a property right
invariably prefer liability rules and use them as an opportunity for govern-
ment rent-seeking.24 In particular, Epstein suggests, parties see courts or
administrative agencies overseeing liability regimes as providing a "cheap
option"-i.e., a better deal than they could obtain in a marketplace
25arrangement. As we discuss in Part IV, the implementation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides a notable case in point as to how
liability rules can go awry. The distinction between property and liability
rules and the ensuing law and economics literature that has built upon it
increasingly informs IP law as well and has led commentators to oppose
compulsory licenses and favor strong property rules in IP.
As we also discuss in Part IV, however, it may well be the particular
choices implementing such a regime and not the conceptual basis for the re-
gime that are suspect. Moreover, as we discuss in the next two sections,
there are important cases in Internet and IP law that demonstrate the merits of
a liability rule-and the pitfalls of a property rule-in certain technology
markets. Unfortunately, many commentators fail to appreciate the differ-
ences between entitlements in information and in tangible property. As we
explain in Part II, this oversight is significant because there are important
reasons to think that the misallocation costs are substantively worse, and per-
haps even endemic, in IP.
B. The Internet as an Argument Against Property Rules: Transaction Costs
and the Case of "CyberTrespass"
To challenge the application of Epstein's Law in the Internet context,
consider the issue of access to Web pages. With over ten billion Web pages
in existence, granting property entitlements to each Web site owner to con-
trol access by each of the hundreds of millions of Internet users would
require an astonishing number of agreements to permit the Internet to
function. The legal standards in this area have been tested in a series of cases
in which owners of Web pages open to the public nonetheless sought to use
the personal property doctrine of trespass to chattels to exclude particular
visitors to their site. The most notable cases are eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc. 26 and Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.
27
As in many of the trespass to chattels cases arising in the Internet




26. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
27. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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sought to exclude a company from using automated software "robots" (or
bots) to search the site and gather information.28 In Bidder's Edge, the court
quickly assumed that a property rule should govern this context, reasoning
that "[i]f preliminary injunctive relief against an ongoing trespass to chattels
were unavailable, a trespasser could take a compulsory license to use
another's personal property for as long as the trespasser could perpetuate the
litigation. ' '29 In so doing, the court eschewed the suggestion that a rule of
open access should govern in this context, instead establishing a broad prop-
30erty rule.
In Hamidi, by contrast, the court ruled that Intel did not have the right to
limit selectively who should be able to send email to its employees by alleg-
ing a trespass to its email servers. 31 The court noted that while there are
plausible benefits from a property rule (such as helping to "force spammers
to internalize the costs they impose on ISP's and their customers" 32), the
overall impact of selecting and enforcing a property rule was unclear. In
particular, it concluded that it was unwise to act "rashly to adopt a rule
treating computer servers as real property for purposes of trespass law.",33 In
so concluding, the court emphasized the number of transactions that would
have to occur for basic Internet services such as search engines to function if
each Web site had the fight to stop traffic from any source. 34 It therefore im-
plicitly relied on the transaction costs problem identified by Calabresi and
Melamed.
Neither Bidder's Edge nor Hamidi evaluated carefully whether or not
there was a holdup or transaction cost concern that might justify a liability
rule. 35 To be sure, each court relied on a short cut or intuition as to whether
transaction costs were a viable concern. The Hamidi court in particular ex-
pressed some skepticism that individual arrangements could be negotiated
among all email users. 36 But the court faced a choice between a strong prop-
erty rule and no liability at all. Given those stark alternatives, it made the
28. 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-63.
29. Id. at 1067.
30. It is notable that the choices courts have faced in these cases have not been between
property rules and liability rules but between property rules and no liability. The starkness of this
choice may influence the views of the courts. See supra notes 11- 12 and accompanying text. To
avoid such an extreme choice, Dan Burk has argued that courts should use the real property doctrine
of nuisance rather than trespass to chattels in the Internet context. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble
with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 53 (2000). To be sure, the use of nuisance
principles does not require a liability rule-courts will still enjoin nuisances in appropriate
circumstances-but it does provide an alternative to the either/or paradigm because it permits courts
to consider whether the costs of an injunction exceed the benefits.
31. 71 P.3d at 299-300.
32. Id. at 311.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For an argument that the users of the Internet could successfully bargain around a property
rule, see David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 341 (2003).
36. 71 P.3dat310-11.
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right choice. Property rules designed with land in mind often do not translate
well to the more fluid environment of the Internet, where they have the po-
tential to impose significant transaction costs and prevent the efficient
functioning of the Internet.37 But it is possible that no liability is also the
wrong result, at least in cases where-unlike Hamidi and possibly unlike
Bidder's Edge-there is actual injury to the plaintiff. A liability rule thus
provides a potential intermediate ground--one the courts have not so far
considered.3 s
C. Fair Use and the Problem of "Zero-Price" Liability Rules
The concept of transaction costs also helps to justify and guide the
39scope of copyright's fair use doctrine. In particular, courts in fair use cases
are very sensitive to whether the permitted use-which is, in effect, "nothing
more than a zero-price compulsory license of copyrighted works" 4 -would
displace any likely benefit to be reaped by the copyright holder.41
37. The Hamidi court, as quoted above in the text, appreciated this point, declining to act
"rashly" and "adopt a rule treating computer servers as real property." Id. at 3 11 (emphasis added);
see also Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1738-39 (2004)
(noting that in the Western frontier, courts opted for a liability regime between farmers and miners
until they better understood which type of lands were suitable for each use). We certainly concur
with this cautionary principle, but also believe that courts can rely on a set of criteria to evaluate the
wisdom of instituting a liability rule in the Internet context. See infra Part IV.
38. An alternate middle ground is the use of a "loperty rule." As Bell and Parchomovsky
explain, a loperty rule is where all comers have presumptive access under a liability rule until a firm
asserts ownership (and gains property rule protection). See Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (2002). Whether a liability rule or a
loperty rule is more appropriate in this context depends on whether the technology exists for Web
page owners to signal a no-access rule that bots and other searching methods can easily follow. For
an argument that a loperty rule is the appropriate middle ground solution, see Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2221 (2004).
39. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9, 566-67
(1985); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1618 (1982). Our focus on
transaction costs evaluates the particular set of concerns around the use of hold up strategies. We
recognize, however, that IP law also addresses other concerns, such as the strategic use of IP rights
to prevent innovations-such as the VCR-from challenging incumbent business models. See
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1386-90 (2004); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property,
Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 143-44 (2006). So too does fair use
address other, nontransaction cost concerns. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and
Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002)
(arguing that judges hearing fair use challenges should weigh the competing interests of preserving
incentives to author new works versus allowing the public to use or transform existing works, and
should not simply ask whether market failure is likely to occur due to high transaction costs). An
analysis of these arguments, and how they would or would not justify reliance on liability rules or
fair use, is beyond the scope of this Article.
40. Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
675, 712 (1993).
41. In particular, the Copyright Act specifies a four-part inquiry for judging whether access is
appropriate under the fair use doctrine:
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Unfortunately, while copyright scholars widely appreciate how the fair use
doctrine is informed by the transaction costs concept,42 far fewer scholars
focus on the significant role played by compulsory licenses in copyright law
and the validity of the transaction costs justification for them.43
Rather than a liability rule, the fair use doctrine provides courts with an
all-or-nothing choice. When it applies, the copyright owner gets neither an
injunction nor damages; when it does not apply, they are entitled to both
(including, in many cases, a claim for statutory damages).44 Rejecting a
claim of fair use thus gives the copyright owner both the right to compensa-
tion for the defendant's use and the right to prevent or control the
circumstances of that use. And courts have given teeth to that right, not only
finding infringement and awarding damages but also granting injunctions
against works that did not pay a licensing fee, even if the copyrighted work
was only a small part of the enjoined work.45
Despite the fair use doctrine's all-or-nothing character, there are many
circumstances in which the issues of copyright owner compensation and
control should logically be separated. 6 Consider, for example, the class of
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). On the fourth factor, which is widely acknowledged to be the most
important, the Supreme Court has emphasized that this judgment must rest on a careful evaluation
of the relevant market impact. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593-94
(1994).
42. Compare Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 804 (2001) (suggesting that electronic
contracting means that the fair use defense is no longer necessary to address market failures), with
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian "' World of
On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 133-35 (1997) (arguing that market failure
justification may limit fair use and that this doctrine can also be justified on redistributive grounds).
43. For a notable exception, see Tim Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 278 (2004). For a more general discussion of liability rules in IP, see JEROME H. REICHMAN
& CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY LISENCING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS (2003),
available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/CS-reichman-hasenzahl.pdf.
44. See Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 513, 525-27 (1999) (making this point, and additionally arguing that both
injunctive relief and fair use should be rejected and copyright owners should be entitled only to
actual damages).
45. See, e.g., Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(enjoining distribution of the film 12 Monkeys because a copyrighted chair was featured in several
scenes); Jeff Leeds, Judge Freezes Notorious B.LG. Album, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at B2
(reporting on a court decision that enjoined the sales of multi-platinum rap album because it
contained unlicensed samples from The Ohio Players).
46. We are not the first to suggest this separation of compensation and control. See
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and
Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 339 (2006) ("This connection between control and
compensation, however, is neither inevitable nor necessary. It would be possible, for example, to
structure an intellectual property system that offered a compensation mechanism without entitling
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cases in which the defendant's use is transformative. In most of those cases,
even if the fair use claim is rejected, society will be best served by a rule that
allows compensation for the copyright owner but denies them control over
the defendant's work. Giving the defendant control puts the dissemination of
the defendant's original expression at the mercy of the copyright owner and
copyright owners may be particularly bad stewards of other people's takes on
their works. Such cases might arise not only where the additional expression
is unflattering,47 but also where it is simply undervalued48 or where, for a
host of reasons, the parties cannot come to terms.49
Even if we think the copyright owner is losing revenue to a
transformative use and deserves compensation, it may be reasonable to be-
lieve that the defendant's additional expression is also valuable and that the
copyright owner should not be entitled to control the defendant's use.5°
Similarly, providing compensation without control may be appropriate where
the production of a particular type of work requires clearances of so many
rights, or rights are so hard to find, that doing so would be uneconomic.
Where a rights owner should be entitled to some compensation for a use, but
where control can create problems, a liability rule is the natural solution.
Over the years, Congress has enacted compulsory licenses to address situa-
tions like this, 5' and private collective licenses have emerged in other
contexts. 52 Of late, some commentators have proposed new compulsory li-
censes for clearing rights to peer-to-peer file sharing,53 song samples, 4 and
orphan works.55
the holder to control rights in their current form."). Arewa goes on to suggest giving the heirs of
copyright owners compensation rights but only limited control rights, id. at 347, a proposal with
which we are very sympathetic to, but which is outside the scope of this Article.
47. To be sure, some artists will be amenable to licensing their work to allow parodies of it, but
it is generally not a good idea to give copyright owners such control. Many will not license the
right to make fun of them, while others may license relatively tame parodies but not more biting
ones.
48. For example, Roy Orbison's music company was unwilling to license the rights to remake
"Pretty Woman" to 2 Live Crew at any price. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 572 (1994). The record is silent on why that is, but one plausible explanation is that they did
not see the value in rap music. On the systematic disparity between private and social value of
creation, see Brett Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
49. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEXAS L. REV. 989, 1048-72 (1997) (discussing myriad reasons efficient copyright licensing might
not occur); see also Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 85, 104-05 (2003) (arguing that there are reasons to believe a platform owner will be a
good steward of the platform but acknowledging an important array of exceptions).
50. This paragraph is adapted from Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require
Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 12-13), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=917161.
51. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114, 115, 118, 119 (2000).
52. See, e.g., BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
53. WILLIAM W. FISHER Ill, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
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II. Holdup and Scope Concerns with Property Rules
Calabresi and Melamed identified significant transaction costs as a
justification that, where present, forms a powerful basis for the use of a li-
ability rule.56 Moreover, they classify the holdout problem as an example of
transaction costs, explaining that if a buyer must aggregate rights from a
number of different parties in order to achieve a useful end result, it will have
to deal with a number of different sellers. In fact, though, the problem is not
just the layering of multiple transactions but the risk of strategic behavior
attendant on each one. The reason Calabresi and Melamed refer to this as the
"holdout" problem is because of the danger that one or more property owners
in this situation will use their power to refuse access to their property to de-
mand a disproportionate share of the revenue from the joint project and that
if many people engage in such behavior, the aggregating project will be made
impossible.
Holdout behavior, however, is only one aspect of the problem. At least
in the context of IP and technology law more generally, the difficulty goes
further than envisioned by Calabresi and Melamed. The reason has to do
with the uncertain scope of many rights protected by property rules. In
particular, Calabresi and Melamed assumed that the scope of property rights
was well defined. Because their paradigm example of property rule entitle-
ments was real property, this assumption made considerable sense. With
very minor exceptions, it is quite easy to find out where the boundaries of a
real property right are and the scope of injunctive relief is accordingly well
tailored to the violation of the right. Significantly, in those few cases in
which that is not true, such as nuisance cases, courts generally do not protect
an entitlement with a strong property rule.57
A number of rights protected by property rules feature injunctive relief
that is not well tailored to protect only the underlying entitlement. Consider
the case of patents. In theory, the claims of a patent serve the same role as
the legal description in a real property deed,58 but it is impossible in practice
54. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From JC. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 638-41 (2006).
55. Congress is currently considering creating a rule restricting the remedies available to the
owners of "orphan works"--works where the holder of the relevant rights cannot be identified after
a reasonable search. The version of the bill pending at this writing provides that for such orphan
works "an award for monetary relief (including actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and
attorney's fees) may not be made, other than an order requiring the infringer to pay reasonable
compensation for the use of the infringed work." H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. § 514(b)(1)(A) (2006).
56. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1119.
57. See Burk, supra note 30passim (discussing these cases).
58. See, e.g., In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("[C]laims are not technical descriptions of the disclosed inventions but are legal documents like the
descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area conveyed but do not
describe the land.").
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to perfectly define inventions in terms of words.59 Copyrights are also ill-
defined, not because we don't know what the copyright owner has created
but because the legal rules are sufficiently vague that we don't know whether
a particular aspect of the work is an expression entitled to protection or part
of the unprotectable idea; moreover, in many cases, it is difficult to know in
advance whether a particular use is infringing or not.60  Similarly, rights to
use the radio spectrum can be subject to considerable uncertainty and give
rise to a related dynamic.
The fact that a right cannot be clearly defined means that injunctive
relief is a remedy with significant error costs. An injunction preventing me
from entering your land is tailored to the scope of the right being protected;
any injury it causes me stems from the protection of the property right itself.
By contrast, an injunction based on an unclear property right will sometimes
underserve and sometimes overserve the goal of protecting the legal right.
Further, courts having found infringement may tend to err on the side of
overprotection, expanding the injunction against a "bad actor" to make sure
the property right is fully protected. The result is that property rules will tend
to enjoin lawful as well as unlawful conduct in cases where courts err in de-
fining the scope of an uncertain right. As an analogy in real property,
imagine a court unsure of where the boundaries lay protecting a property
owner against trespass by enjoining anyone from coming "too close" to the
property line.
In practice, the problem is significantly worse than simply our inability
to clearly define the rights we protect with property rules. Even in many
cases with clear property rights, the law cannot limit the scope of the injunc-
tion to cover only infringement of the right. Sometimes, this will be a result
of the physical nature of the goods-your patented circuit has already been
built into my semiconductor chip, and an injunction that prevents me from
selling the circuit also prevents me from selling all the noninfringing aspects
of the chip (at least until I can retool my fab or redesign the chip some years
from now). In other cases, the injunction scope problem comes from an in-
formation failure-the defendant cannot know in advance whether a
particular use will or will not violate the injunction and so must either refrain
from participating in a market altogether or replace an efficient automated
59. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a
patent application."); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29 (2005) (arguing that the indeterminacy of patent claims may be
inherent in the process of mapping words to things); Jim Bessen & Michael Meurer, If You Can't
Tell the Boundaries, It Ain't Property 8 (Sept. 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://students.law.umich.edu/mttlr/patentsanddiversity/drafts/draft-meurer.pdf.
60. See Mark A. Lemley, What's Different About Intellectual Property, 83 TEXAS L. REV.
1097, 1101 (2005) ("A user may know that a particular work is copyrighted, but that knowledge
gives him little sense of whether a particular use of the work is legal or not, because the idea-
expression dichotomy, the filtration of facts and scenes-a-faire, the merger doctrine, and the fair use
doctrine make it hard to tell whether a surprisingly wide range of uses are permissible.").
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system with inefficient hand review. Still other cases involve jurisdictional
overlap--an injunction against a Web site prevents its being viewed not only
in jurisdictions where it is illegal but also in jurisdictions that would permit
the site. More generally, the problem is that when injunctive relief is not
well tailored to the rights being protected, courts are left with the choice of
giving no protection or giving too much protection.
Recent economic analysis teaches us that, unsurprisingly, rights owners
can and do take advantage of these problems with legal definition and the
overbroad enforcement of property rights.61 Notably, because rights holders
know that they can obtain an injunction that disadvantages the defendant
more than it benefits them, they use that knowledge to drive settlement rates
well above the "benchmark" rate based on the value of the licensed right ab-
sent the ability to strategically threaten an injunction. Using plausible
assumptions, Lemley and Shapiro show that the royalties-rights owners can
negotiate and, with the leverage of an injunction broader in scope than their
right, easily obtain a settlement two or three times value of that right.62
Significantly, the problem with overprotective injunctions exists even if
there is only one rights holder making a claim. The presence of multiple
parties, each of whom has such a right, naturally exacerbates the problem.
But it is analytically distinct from the holdout problem because it is not lim-
ited to situations in which a defendant must aggregate permissions from
multiple claimants. Consequently, we refer to the strategic use of litigation
(i.e., the threatened or actual pursuit of injunctive relief) as a "holdup
strategy."
The ability to use a holdup strategy requires a significant exception to
Epstein's Law. Where the scope of property rights is not well defined or
where the scope of injunctions cannot be limited to the scope of those rights,
applying a property rule systematically distorts the result, imposing costs on
defendants out of proportion to the violations they committed. Because
rights holders can and do take advantage of that distortion to negotiate set-
63tlements in the shadow of those too powerful injunctions, we can no longer
simply rely on the "market" (really bilateral bargaining) to lead us to the
right outcome. It will not. And if property rules introduce systematic distor-
tions in this class of cases, liability rules begin to look better by comparison.
61. Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties 24 (Haas Sch. of Bus. & Dep't of
Econ., Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, Working Paper No. 24, Aug. 2006), available at http://faculty.
haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf (concluding that "granting patent holders the nearly
automatic and immediate right to obtain permanent injunctions after they prevail in patent cases
over-rewards the owners of patents," particularly in cases where the patent is for "minor features
used in high-margin products"); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REv. (forthcoming June 2007) (manuscript at 13-14, on file with the
Texas Law Review).
62. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 61 (manuscript at 13).
63. A symmetric problem would exist if injunctions systematically covered less than the scope
of the property right. But most of the real-world situations we have encountered present the
opposite problem, and so it is this one we consider in the text.
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The holdup exception is not widely appreciated and is a particularly
insidious form of strategic behavior. To some scholars, a concern with stra-
tegic behavior-often labeled "the extortion-based principle"-is not a
compelling reason for using a liability rule. Professors Krier and Schwab,
for example, argue that a liability rule that sets a price for access to a re-
source to preclude an extortion strategy actually results in a judicially-set
price rather than one based on market bargaining.64 In particular, they argue
that "gains from trade" should include whatever the parties can bargain for
rather than some limitation based on the intrinsic value of the right being
traded.65 They are right to say that as a general matter the law should not
care about how gains from trade are divided. In the cases we identify,
however, the problem is not with splitting the gains from trade but with giv-
ing the plaintiff the right to control a wide swath of noninfringing uses,
effectively sweeping innocent conduct into the scope of the bargain. We are
skeptical, moreover, that bilateral bargaining can operate effectively in the
holdup context because the disciplining effect of competition is absent.
More importantly, even if Krier and Schwab are right to suggest that property
owners have some entitlement to extract more than the intrinsic value of their
property in some circumstances, the holdup problem we identify in this part
is not one of them. Notably, in the holdup context, it is the impact of over-
protective injunctions that creates the opportunity for strategic use of
litigation.66
Because the legal system itself creates the opportunity for holdup, it has
a special duty to prevent such activity. As we discuss in Part III, copyright
law, patent law, Internet law, and spectrum policy all raise notable cases
where the right to an overprotective injunction-if not ameliorated through a
liability rule-will facilitate holdup strategies and undermine economic effi-
ciency goals. And since IP rights in particular are not entitlements based on
some natural law theory, but are government creations designed to foster
innovation, the law should make sure that those rights actually encourage
innovation rather than facilitating abuses of the system.
III. The Role of Liability Rules in Technology Law
Holdup of the type we discussed in Part II appears in a variety of
technology law contexts. When holdup creates problems for property rules,
the question for technology law is whether it should prefer a liability remedy
that would provide for a reasonable rate for access on an ongoing basis or the
64. Krier & Schwab, supra note 12, at 466-67.
65. Id. at 470-75.
66. In acknowledging this point, Rob Merges observed "[a] farmer adjacent to a cattle ranch
will normally have no trouble determining when cattle have trampled her crops, for purposes of
assessing the need for (and price of) a compensatory exchange. In the [IP right] context, there is no
smoky soot or wandering cattle to serve as an unambiguous marker." Merges, supra note 4, at
2658.
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traditional rule that injunctive relief is generally appropriate.67 As we explain
below, a liability rule is appropriate under a certain set of conditions that
sometimes prevail in an array of legal contexts including patents, copyright,
and spectrum policy.
A. Patents
The patent system is designed with a paradigm invention in mind-a
new device or machine covered by a single patent. Historically, this
paradigm was a fairly accurate portrayal of the typical patent.68  In the last
few decades, however, that has begun to change markedly. More and more
products incorporate not a single new invention but a combination of many
different components, each of which may be the subject of one or more
patents.69 In the information technology sector in particular, modem prod-
ucts such as microprocessors, cell phones, or memory devices can easily be
covered by dozens or even hundreds of different patents. As a striking
example, literally thousands of patents have been identified as essential to the
proposed new standards for 3G cellular telephone systems, 70 and more than
four hundred patents are necessary to produce a DVD.7'
The fact that a great many patents can read on a single product, and that
this is common in certain critical industries, creates practical problems for
72the operation of property rules in patent law. Most significant for our
purposes, injunctions against infringement of a patent covering a small com-
ponent of a larger product will end up preventing the sale of all the
noninfringing components of the product, at least until the defendant can re-
design its product to exclude the infringing component. In the case of
67. In the IP context, injunctive relief is generally an available and appropriate remedy, but it is
not a universal one. Rather, courts must apply traditional principles of equity in deciding whether
injunctions are appropriate in any given circumstance. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126
S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (noting that courts must consider patent injunctions on a case-by-case
basis); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (suggesting that
copyright policy is "not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief').
68. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 93 tbl. 1 (2002) (reporting that until quite recently the majority
of all U.S. patents were for mechanical inventions).
69. We have occasionally seen problems like this before, see Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology
Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
477, 495-503 (2005) (discussing the patent deadlock problem that occurred in the 1920s with the
birth of the radio industry), but they are much more common now than in the past.
70. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 61 (manuscript at 26) (documenting these patents).
71. See Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President &
Chief Patent Counsel, Time Warner), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/fish061506.
pdf.
72. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (2001) (Adam Jaffe et al.
eds.), and Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-701 (1998), for further discussion of
how many patents often read on a single product.
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hardware such as semiconductors or cell phones, pulling and redesigning the
product can potentially involve a year of additional research and develop-
ment and tens of millions of dollars.
The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force
the downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be very
powerful. These threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially
in cases where the injunction is based on a patent covering one small
component of a complex product.73 As Lemley and Shapiro demonstrate, the
threat of an injunction covering a product with noninfringing as well as in-
fringing components can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties in
settlement far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution.74
The uncertainty of a patent's scope further compounds the problem because
it is difficult to tell ex ante if a patent covers a particular product at all. The
problem gets even worse if multiple patent owners assert rights in different
components of the invention because each can use the threat of an injunction
against the whole product to extract a disproportionate share of the profits
from the invention.
Injunction threats in component industries therefore often involve a
strong element of holdup where the defendant has already invested heavily to
design, manufacture, market, and sell the product with the allegedly infring-
ing feature. The problem is the one we identified in the last section-the
scope of the injunction is not well tailored to the nature of the infringement
(i.e., it will affect a wide array of noninfringing component parts). In these
circumstances, courts would be well advised to impose a liability rule rather
than a property rule. Significantly, the Supreme Court's decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. preserves this option, giving courts the power
to deny injunctive relief in appropriate circumstances even after a finding of
infringement at trial.75
The eBay decision recognized the threat of strategic uses of patent
litigation in general and requests for injunctive relief in particular, but it did
73. While in theory defendants can minimize this problem by designing around the invention in
advance, Lemley and Shapiro demonstrate that that too imposes significant costs on patent owners
and that those significant costs translate once again into the ability of patent owners to negotiate a
settlement significantly in excess of the intrinsic value of the patent. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 61 (manuscript at 8) (explaining that the accused infringer's option to "redesign and litigate"
still involves wasted investment in the cases where the patent is ultimately invalidated, and the
patent owner can capture the value of that wasted investment in settlement negotiations).
74. Id.
75. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). In particular, the Court concluded that the Patent Act provides
courts with discretion to grant (or not grant) injunctions based on the traditional four-part test; this
test asks plaintiffs to demonstrate:
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
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not definitively resolve the matter. In fact, the Court did not even take a po-
sition on whether an injunction "should or should not [be] issue[d] in this
particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes arising under the
Patent Act.",76 In his concurrence, however, Justice Kennedy struck a more
skeptical tone toward the use of injunctions than the neutral tone of the
majority opinion or the more sympathetic tone of Chief Justice Roberts's
concurrence (which justified the frequent use of injunctions in patent cases).
In particular, Justice Kennedy highlighted the concern posed by the so-called
"patent trolls,, 77 explaining that "[a]n industry has developed in which firms
use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees., 78 For such firms, he explained, "an
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation,
can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent., 79  In light of these
observations, Justice Kennedy emphasized that courts should exercise their
discretion to deny injunctive relief in at least some circumstances where the
injunction would effectively stop the sale not just of the patented invention
but, for example, of significant unpatented components attached to that
invention.80
We recognize the wisdom of the case-by-case approach adopted in eBay
and have not developed any well-specified formula for determining when
injunctions are appropriate. Nonetheless, we believe that courts should de-
velop core cases where injunctions are viewed as presumptively appropriate
or presumptively inappropriate. 81 It is quite clear to us, for example, that
76. Id. at 1841.
77. The concept of a "patent troll" can be defined in a number of different ways. We
acknowledge that the image colorfully captures the problems in the patent system and that there are
plausible definitions of who constitutes a patent troll (say, a firm that does not produce a product
and purchases a patent for the sole purpose of extracting royalties by threatening litigation). See Joe
Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 12, 2005, http://news.com.
com/Rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-5892996.html. Nonetheless, we believe that the real
solution lies not around defining a particular abuser of the patent system, but rather in addressing
the system's flaws that give rise to such abuses. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent
Trolls? 16-18 (Jan. 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review).
78. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38-39 (2003), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf). As the majority opinion implicitly
recognized, the patent troll concept can be difficult to define precisely because some inventors
reasonably decline to market their products and should not be denied patent protection on that
ground. See id. at 1840 (majority opinion) ("[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers
or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts
to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves.").
79. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. Courts had refused to grant injunctive relief in such cases in the past. See Nemey v.
New York & N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[Where] it is
recognized that the only real advantage to a plaintiff in granting the injunction would be to
strengthen its position in negotiating a settlement, an injunction should not issue").
81. We believe that the identification of "core cases"--i.e., the definition of a set of
circumstances that warrant or do not warrant injunctions-will provide valuable guidance to courts.
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courts should cast a skeptical eye at claims for injunctive relief where the
patent owner is not a direct competitor of the defendant,82 where the defen-
dant did not copy the invention from the patent owner, and where the
patented invention is only a small part of an overall product. In such cases,
an injunction does not seem necessary for market exclusivity or deterrence
purposes, and it is likely to cause significant harm to the makers of products.
In the wake of eBay, some lower courts have recognized that this insight
flows naturally from the requirement of proving irreparable harm,83 suggest-
ing that the courts may eliminate (or at least limit) the ability of firms to use
patent injunctions to engage in holdup strategies.
B. Copyright
A second set of cases presenting problems with the scope of property
rules comes from digital copyright. Two things about digital copyright cases
make the scope of property rules particularly problematic. First, the massive
and distributed nature of the Internet makes it quite common for Internet ser-
vices companies to engage in automated acts of copying and searching.
Search engines, for example, rely on software "robots" to crawl the Web and
download pages to be indexed-so do price comparison sites and a host of
other companies. If a company is not making a volitional decision to make
or not make any given copy, it is very hard to enjoin it from making infring-
ing copies without stopping it from making noninfringing copies as well, or
at least requiring it to abandon automated copying and use much less effi-
cient hand review methods.
An example of this problem arose in Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.84 In that
case, the plaintiff owned the copyrights in pornographic photos. It sued
Google, alleging that Google's image search feature directly infringed its
copyrights because some of the Web sites Google indexed included unau-
thorized copies of Perfect 10's photos, and Google's image search engine
made and displayed a low-resolution "thumbnail" of all the images it
Consequently, we reject the argument made by some (including Epstein) that any rule other than a
presumptive availability of an injunction in all cases will "cloud the remedial question in
unnecessary obscurity." Brief for Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130),
2006 WL 639164, at *13.
82. Making this determination involves some complexity. A patent owner who competes with
the defendant should generally be entitled to an injunction even if the patent owner does not sell the
patented invention but instead a substitute invention. Further, patent owners may try to game the
system we propose by making sham sales in order to present themselves as a competitor, and courts
will have to consider such circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
83. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441-42 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(rejecting a requested injunction on the grounds that Microsoft only used a small portion of the
infringing product and that it is not likely that any consumer purchasing Microsoft Office or
Windows does so for the purpose of using the functionality in question, meaning that there would
be no lost profits, harmed brand recognition, or loss of market share).
84. 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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indexed, including those that infringed Perfect 10's copyrights.85 The district
court generally showed great sensitivity to the realities of search engine tech-
nology and held that a number of basic activities such as site caching and
inline linking to the infringing Web pages were not acts of copyright
infringement. 86 It held, however, that providing thumbnail copies of particu-
lar images in the search results infringed Perfect 10's copyright because these
copies might interfere with the sale of low-resolution images for download to
cell phones. 87 The court therefore held that Perfect 10 was entitled to a pre-
liminary injunction preventing Google from making thumbnail copies of
infringing Perfect 10 pictures.88
The problem with the court's ruling is that there is no way for Google to
stop only the display of thumbnails of those photos that are infringing Perfect
10's copyrights. Google already complies with § 512(d) of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which means that it takes down links
and thumbnails to any site once it gets a notice of infringement on that site.
But Perfect 10 wanted (and theoretically got) more: an injunction that re-
quires Google to somehow ensure that no Perfect 10 images appear in its
search results. As a practical matter, however, there is no way for Google to
do this in the context of an automated search system. Imposing an "opt-in"
system will not help because the problem here is third-party sites that copy
Perfect 10's photos. Those infringing sites may opt in to search engine
coverage-indeed, they have effectively done so by not using the Robot
Exclusion Header-but that does not mean the copyright owner approves of
indexing. Even requiring Google to hand check for infringement, which
would slow the search process tremendously (and add to its expense), would
not guarantee that Google could stop all infringing works from showing up in
search results. The only completely reliable way Google could comply with
such an injunction would be to shut down its image search service altogether.
In the context of an automated search feature, complying with an injunction
that is nominally tailored to cover only infringing material may require shut-
ting down an enormous swath of noninfringing content.
When the Perfect 10 court released the details of the injunction it
imposed, it was clear that it appreciated the concerns set out above. Notably,
it departed from the traditional "right to exclude" aspect of real property and
provided Google with considerable leeway in complying with the court's
order. In particular, the court did not enjoin Google from infringing, but in-
stead set forth a notice and takedown regime very similar to the one provided
85. Id. at 832-34.
86. Id. at 844 ("Merely to index the web so that users can more readily find the information
they seek should not constitute direct infringement.").
87. Id. at 849.
88. Id. at 851.
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by the DMCA that Google was already following. 89 In adopting such a lim-
ited remedy, the court effectively removed much of the sting from its liability
ruling, although there is no guarantee that other courts will not adopt its li-
ability ruling and impose a more aggressive form of injunctive relief.
The second dynamic that makes the scope of property rules problematic
in the digital copyright environment is the nature of the defendants.
Copyright owners in the digital environment are increasingly suing not only
direct infringers, but also those further and further removed from direct in-
fringement who nonetheless take actions that facilitate that infringement.
90
When the defendant is not actually making copies but providing a "dual use"
technology-a general product or service that can be used either for infring-
ing or noninfringing ends-it is much harder to limit the scope of an
injunction to only those uses that are infringing.
The peer-to-peer (p2p) software cases provide high profile examples of
this problem. While Napster was held to have contributed to copyright in-
fringement by providing a centralized file sharing service, the Ninth Circuit
made it clear that it was only the facilitation of infringement, not the p2p
technology itself, which was problematic. 91 Nonetheless, the district court
entered an injunction requiring Napster to expunge all infringing material
from its system. 92  That turned out to be impossible to do with 100%
accuracy, meaning that the order effectively required Napster to shut down,
which indeed it did. As a practical manner, such an injunction effectively
extended to noninfringing as well as infringing material. In the context of
Napster, this impact may not strike many individuals as much of a loss, since
something like 99% of the material on the Napster system was infringing.
But as injunctions are entered against p2p software with more and more
noninfringing uses-reportedly 10-30% of the files available via Grokster,
for example 93-the overbroad scope of the injunction becomes more and
more problematic.
The Supreme Court's disposition of the Grokster case,94 like its
disposition of eBay, dodged the fundamental question of when a property
rule is appropriate. In particular, the Court relied on a theory of inducement
to conclude that Grokster and other p2p networks may well have been liable
under copyright law because of evidence of their intent to encourage
89. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484AHM (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2006) (order granting
preliminary injunction) (on file with the authors).
90. Lemley & Reese, supra note 39, at 1347-49.
91. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that
liability is not imposed for merely providing the means to accomplish an infringing activity).
92. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2001).
93. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
94. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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infringement.95 In so doing, the Court avoided resolving the debate outlined
in the dueling concurrences in that case as to whether and when innovators
should be able to rely on the safe-harbor rule devised in Sony,96 under which
a specific set of envisioned lawful uses immunized a developer from liability
based on other foreseeable unlawful uses. 97 Ultimately, however, the Court
will have to address this very issue. We believe that when injunctive relief
results in a shutdown of significant noninfringing uses along with the in-
fringing uses, the use of a property rule is inappropriate. Consequently, if the
Court (or Congress) revises the "substantial noninfringing use" test and finds
liability in such cases, it should institute a liability rule rather than a property
rule as the appropriate remedy.98 Along these very lines, the district court in
Grokster (after the Supreme Court's remand) has moved toward a hybrid re-
gime along the lines of that implemented in Perfect 10, issuing a preliminary
ruling that apparently would not require Streamcast to stop all infringement
on its system, but only to implement reasonably effective filtering software. 99
C. International Injunctions Against Web Sites
The property rule tailoring problem also arises with some frequency
when governments seek to regulate the Internet. The problem here comes
from the jurisdictional nature of government regulation and the inherently
international nature of the Internet. Whenever a court enforces a state or na-
tional regulation against a Web site by granting an injunction, it imposes a
remedy that is likely to have effects outside its jurisdiction. Defendants must
either find some technical means of applying the court's rule only to site
visitors that come from the jurisdiction, or (more likely) must block access to
content by those outside the jurisdiction as well. Sometimes this is not much
of a problem because the conduct is likely to be illegal everywhere in the
world. But in many cases national laws will regulate content that is legal in
other jurisdictions. When that happens, an injunction--or worse, criminal
liability-00 -against a Web site can have consequences in other jurisdictions
where that content is legal.
95. See id. at 931-41.
96. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
97. Compare Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), with id. at 956-57 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
98. It is not enough merely to deny injunctions because copyrights, unlike patents, have
statutory damages that can far exceed that necessary to compensate plaintiffs. On the problem of
setting a compulsory license rate that actually approximates injury to the plaintiff, see Lemley,
supra note 50 (manuscript at 20-24).
99. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., CV 01-8541 SVW (C.D. Cal. Feb.
16, 2007) (order requiring further briefing re plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction) (on file
with authors), available at http://fl 1 .fmdlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mgm/mgmgrokster
42503ord.pdf.
100. On the relationship between property rules and criminal sanctions, see David D. Haddock
et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1990).
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Three quick examples should suffice. First, United States courts have
enjoined the distribution of second-generation p2p technology because they
found the intent of the distributors was to induce copyright infringement.1
But Dutch courts had previously held the same technology legal.10 2  In
theory, it might be possible for Streamcast to distribute the technology only
in the Netherlands, but as a practical matter U.S. courts might well hold them
in contempt if the software were still available on the Web site after the in-
junction takes effect.
Second, a French court held Yahoo! criminally liable for permitting the
distribution of Nazi memorabilia on its Web site, in violation of a French law
that prevents any speech that promotes fascism. 0 3  There is no question,
however, that the distribution of this memorabilia would be protected in the
United States under the First Amendment. To protect that right, Yahoo!
sought a protective order from a U.S. court preventing the enforcement of the
French ruling in the United States. The district court granted their request,1
0 4
but the court of appeals ultimately reversed for unrelated procedural
reasons. 0 5 The end result is that Yahoo! must either find a way to isolate
French users from its normal Web site content or face criminal liability in
France for conduct that is legal elsewhere. 
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101. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 983-84
(C.D. Cal. 2006). But see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., CV 01-8541 SVW
at 9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2007) (order requiring further briefing re plaintiffs' motion for a permanent
injunction) (on file with authors), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.comi/hdocs/docs/
mgm/mgmgrokster42503ord.pdf (suggesting that the permanent injunction might extend only to
acts of inducement, not to the distribution of the software itself).
102. For the final Dutch ruling, see Buma/KaZaA, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme
Court of the Netherlands], 19 December 2003, NJ 186 (ann. JMH) (Neth.).
103. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov.
20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf.
104. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
105. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1224 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc).
106. How far Yahoo! must go to ensure that French users have no access to the contraband
content is unclear. Joel Reidenberg has argued that the French court decision has been
mistranslated, and that the court required only "les mesures de nature," which he translates as "the
type of measures" that "render impossible any access" to the Nazi memorabilia rather than
"necessary measures" that render access impossible. Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet
Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1951, 1959 (2005). We will defer to his translation of the term.
We are less persuaded that requiring Yahoo! to take "the type of measures" that "render impossible
any access" by a French citizen to the Nazi Web site is a flexible or manageable standard. While
Reidenberg reads this as a "best efforts" requirement, something that would ameliorate the problem
in much the same way as the ultimate injunction in Perfect 10, it is not clear to us that the French
court's opinion is so limited. Even if it is, imposing a requirement on Yahoo! to identify the
nationality of each of its users has significant negative consequences for privacy and anonymity,
because it effectively requires Web sites to identify their users and use geolocation tools to
determine if they are accessing a Web site from France. For a discussion of the problems this
causes for the open Intemet, see Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders On, or Border Around-The
Future of the Internet, 16 ALB. L.J. SCl. & TECH. 343 (2006).
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Finally, a variety of jurisdictions in the United States, including most
recently the federal government, have banned not only Internet gambling but
also facilitation of gambling by credit card companies. 10 7 But Internet gam-
bling is legal in many jurisdictions, including the U.K. However, the U.S.
courts have applied U.S. laws so broadly as to reach defendants who run
gambling sites abroad, even going so far as to arrest the president of a legiti-
mate U.K. company who happened to be passing through the United States
on his way to Latin America.'08 Criminal sanctions, even more than injunc-
tive relief, will chill the provision of legitimate content abroad.
In all of these circumstances and more, the problem is akin to the ones
we have discussed in patent and copyright cases-because of the inherently
international nature of the Internet, the courts cannot easily enforce a rule in
one jurisdiction without having effects on conduct that is legal in other
jurisdictions.
D. Spectrum Policy
In 1959, Ronald Coase opened the ongoing debate over spectrum policy
reform. In his landmark article, Coase criticized the FCC's regulatory re-
gime for unduly restricting access to and the use of radio spectrum,
explaining that its practice of classifying the potential uses of spectrum and
limiting what frequency bands could be used for particular services was a
recipe for maximizing transaction costs. 10 9 In particular, under the classic
regulatory system used by the FCC-the command and control model-the
agency created a "mother may I" regime where any potential innovator
needed to ask permission before it could deploy a particular service, even if a
current spectrum licensee wished to lease or sell access to the new
innovator. 10 Somewhat predictably, this system invited rent-seeking behav-
ior by incumbents who would use their influence at the FCC to prevent (or
delay) the authorization of new services."'
How to regulate the radio spectrum remains a rich topic for technology
law debates. The radio spectrum-which facilitates wireless communication
107. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 802,
120 Stat. 1957 (2006) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 5363).
108. See 11 Charged in Web Gambling Crackdown, CBS NEWS, July 18, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/18/national/mainl 812590.shtml.
109. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17-40
(1959).
110. See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Broadband Migration III: New Directions in
Wireless Policy (Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/PoweIlU2002/spmkp212.
html (recognizing that innovation in wireless technologies is "inhibited by the 'mother may I'
phenomenon-businesses must go to the FCC for permission before they can modify their spectrum
plans to respond to consumer demand").
111. For a powerful rendition of the series of episodes where incumbents acted in this manner,
see Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction
Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation
Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001).
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devices ranging from cellular telephones to traditional AM/FM radios to sat-
ellite TV receivers-consists of the range of frequencies that can be used to
transmit information over the "airwaves." In the case of traditional (analog)
cellular services, for example, a frequency range-often called a "channel"
or, for larger ones, a "band"-of 30,000 Hertz (the unit used to define
frequencies) provides enough "bandwidth" for a reliable communications
link.
112
Almost fifty years after Coase's landmark article, the FCC continues to
closely regulate the uses to which spectrum can be put. Under today's regu-
latory regime, the FCC still wields considerable authority as to whether a
service is authorized to operate using radio spectrum and what bands of
spectrum can be licensed to firms interested in providing a particular service.
Moreover, in many cases, if a spectrum licensee wants to sell or lease its li-
censes to a different kind of service provider, it is barred by
telecommunications law from doing so, even if such a sale would be a win-
win-win transaction (i.e., beneficial for the seller, the buyer, and consumers
alike).
For Coase, and many other economists who study spectrum regulation,
the direction for regulatory reform is clear: propertize the spectrum and re-
move the FCC from the position of closely regulating its use." 3  The
attractiveness of this position is its fidelity to the insights of the Coase
Theorem-private parties, far better than the government, can ensure that
property rights are put to their best use. The FCC has indeed recognized the
wisdom of embracing a property rights-like model in spectrum regulation,
hailing its attractiveness in the Spectrum Policy Task Force report and
adopting a secondary markets initiative that allows spectrum licensees to
lease or trade rights to use spectrum without intrusive FCC oversight.' 
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Despite recognizing the appeal of a system of property rights, the FCC
has moved slowly to implement such a model. To some, this lack of alacrity
reflects the agency's resistance toward letting go of its traditional command-
and-control attitude toward the use of spectrum. 15  But there is another
important dynamic at work: it is hardly self-evident how to "propertize"
spectrum licenses.
112. Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 663, 667 (2005).
113. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to
Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1999).
114. Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development
of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (adopted May 15, 2003); Spectrum Policy Task Force,
FCC, ET Docket No. 02-135, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report (2002). The FCC has also
recognized the value of treating some swaths of spectrum as a commons and allowing anyone to use
it (say, for a garage door opener or a wi-fi network), but that is another story. For a discussion of
the virtues of the commons model as well as the challenges of making it work, see Weiser &
Hatfield, supra note 112.
115. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why
Did FCC LicenseAuctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998).
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The principal efforts to develop a property rights framework for
spectrum licenses have suggested that the agency can simply define power
limits that transmitters use so that they do not emit greater than allowable
levels of radio frequency transmissions either at the adjacent band or at the
geographic boundary.' 16 This model assumes that radio transmissions can be
managed to prevent interference with a high degree of accuracy and that
property rights in spectrum can thus be defined in a manner reasonably
similar to their real property counterparts. In a rough sense, this model is
similar to the vision for patent law that presupposes that patents can be rea-
sonably well defined and that infringers are willfully acting in a lawless
manner. We are skeptical. As in the patent context, rights in radio spectrum
are not only often poorly defined, but they are not easy to define even under
the best of circumstances. As a consequence, a real property-like system for
spectrum regulation would likely create significant opportunities for strategic
litigation and holdup behavior.' 17
The current model of spectrum regulation relies on a poorly defined
standard of "harmful interference." '" 8 That standard, by its very nature, is
not defined until parties file their objections at the FCC and claim that one
user of spectrum is violating its obligation not to create harmful
interference."l 9 If the FCC were to substitute this regime with one based on
predefined property rights, say, by restricting the power levels at the geo-
graphic boundary and adjacent bands, it could theoretically promise to
enforce these limits as property rights. Under this system, the FCC would
transition from an environment where it defined allowable uses after the fact
to one where it defined the rights before-the-fact and enforced them after-the-
fact by imposing injunctions for trespass.120
The use of a trespass model would provide parties with an expectation
of protection against interference rooted in a property-like right. With this
right, a spectrum licensee who detected radio transmissions in its authorized
geographic area from a neighboring user (or from an adjacent band) could
116. Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1513-17 (1969)
(explaining that field strengths need to have a specific limit of Xv/m in order to protect area rights
and geographic boundaries and a specific limit of Y v/m in order to protect spectrum rights and
adjacent bands).
117. A longer explanation of this argument is available in Dale Hatfield & Phil Weiser,
Property Rights in Spectrum: Taking the Next Step (Univ. of Colo. Law Legal Studies, Working
Paper No. 06-20, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=818624.
118. The FCC defines "harmful interference" as "interference which endangers the functioning
of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or
repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with [international]
Radio Regulations." 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2006).
119. For an excellent discussion of the importance of and challenges inherent in doing so, see
R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now: Getting Better Reception from the FCC's Spectrum Policy,
2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_STLR_5/index.htm.
120. See De Vany et al., supra note 116, at 1512-17 (discussing the dimensions of the
spectrum-use rights under the proposed property rights system).
Texas Law Review
request an injunction that would shut down the interfering service. In
principle, this remedy might sound appropriate-just like the propriety of a
remedy that would enable a patent holder to bar an infringer from infringing
on its product. But as in the patent context, some spectrum licensees will
have invested enormous resources into the relevant equipment to provide
service and to market their product. Moreover, just as with patents, the rights
of the adjacent spectrum licensee may be less than clear insofar as radio
transmissions will vary depending on a variety of circumstances-i.e.,
season, natural and artificial obstacles, and weather. And the enjoined inter-
fering user may in fact be transmitting its signal in a large geographic area,
only a small part of which overlaps with the property owner's right. But by
imposing an injunction against any geographic interference, the FCC may
well require the interfering transmitter to reduce its power and thus stop
serving not only the interfering region but also a number of unproblematic
regions as well. One can, as a rough analogy, think of these regions as akin
to the noninfringing uses in our copyright example-i.e., casualties of an in-
junction that necessarily sweeps more broadly than necessary to address the
relevant harm.
Due to the dynamic nature of radio transmissions, one can easily
imagine circumstances changing so that transmissions that once might not
have created interference are now doing so. Indeed, the circumstances that
might give rise to such a scenario might not be obvious, as certain forms of
radio transmissions, such as AM broadcasting, are particularly difficult to
control or predict. Consequently, if firms were allowed to purchase spectrum
licensees and automatically enjoin any transmissions that created interference
(whether or not they were actually providing a service that was affected by
the so-called interference), such a system would invite strategic behavior and
results similar to those associated with the "patent troll" phenomenon.
We are not suggesting that the difficulties in creating a regime for
recognizing property rules in spectrum justify a delay in replacing the tradi-
tional (and inefficient) command-and-control regime. 121 Rather, as in patent
law and copyright law, policymakers should appreciate that ill-defined prop-
erty rights regimes create challenges of their own making-the possibility of
firms acquiring rights that give rise to holdup-type behavior. Consequently,
in devising the appropriate protections for the right at issue, policymakers
should limit the availability of injunctive-type relief in order to avoid this
scenario and, in at least some circumstances, rely on a tort-based damages
standard system. 122 Moreover, because the nature of the appropriate relief
will depend on the particular technological characteristics of how radios op-
121. One could, as a means of avoiding these difficulties, embrace the current system and its
use of prophylactic protections against interference-including limits on what service a licensee can
operate and whether a license is freely alienable.
122. For an argument that effectively explains the case for liability rules in spectrum policy,
see Ellen Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269 (2004).
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erate and will involve significant limitations on injunctive relief, we believe
that an expert body like the FCC-as opposed to a generalist court familiar
with traditional property law principles-should be charged with superin-
tending property rights in spectrum. 1
23
IV. The Limits of Liability Rules and the Role for Agency Oversight
The great virtue of property rules is that they economize on
"information costs" and empower private parties to solve access issues
through market-based solutions. As Henry Smith explains, the case for a
governance regime (i.e., a liability rule of some kind) over an exclusion re-
gime (i.e., a property rule) rests on the nature of the relevant information
costs and the ability of a governmental actor to devise terms of access in an
effective manner.1 24 This question cannot, however, be answered categori-
cally in favor of one regime or the other, but rather turns on the issue of
comparative institutional competence and the circumstances of particular
situations.125  If bargaining in the shadow of injunctive relief leads to
systematically skewed results, as we suggested is true in the examples in Part
III, judicially or administratively designed liability rules look better by
comparison. To evaluate the comparative institutional competence questions
related to whether a court or agency should superintend a liability regime,
this Part outlines the relevant criteria for managing liability rules effectively
and underscores where agencies are more likely to be effective than courts in
overseeing the relevant liability rule.
The effectiveness of liability rules enforced by courts will often depend
on the complexity of the liability rule. There are at least three critical factors
that will contribute to the complexity of access regimes. First, can multiple
parties have access to the resource without interference? Second, will the
information necessary to design effective access arrangements be readily
available and apparent to a regulator or court? Third, how dynamic is the set
of relationships and technology in question? We shall discuss each in turn.
We begin, however, with a cautionary tale about overambitious liability rule
regimes.
A. The Telecom Act and the Risks of Overbroad and Ambitious Liability
Rules
To understand the pitfalls of an overambitious liability rule regime,
consider the strategy advanced by the FCC in the wake of the
123. This proposal is developed in Hatfield & Weiser, supra note 117.
124. Smith, supra note 37, at 1753.
125. See Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 267 (2002) (providing an
analysis of different situations when each rule would be appropriate).
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.126 In 1996, Congress radically overhauled
U.S. communications law, calling for competition in all telecommunications
markets. In local telecommunications markets, the incumbent monopolists
were ordered to provide access and interconnection to their networks,
including the leasing of network elements on an unbundled basis. 127  In
principle, this strategy would enable new entrants to lease the line to a
subscriber's home (called a "local loop") or its transport capacity so that it
could enter the market without doing so using only its own facilities. By so
doing, the 1996 Act sought to prevent incumbent monopolists from using
their control over the local network to stifle new entry in the local market.
In the wake of the 1996 Act's enactment, the FCC developed rules
relating to what became known as "unbundled network elements" (UNEs). 128
During the decade after the Act, the entrants and incumbents argued (at the
FCC and in court) over the extent of unbundling required by the Act and the
relevant price for network elements, 129 with little progress to show for this
effort ten years after it commenced.
The 1996 Act provides a cautionary tale for how liability rules can look
better in theory than in practice. The 1996 Act addressed the compelling
concern that the incumbent local monopolists would not surrender their bot-
tleneck hold on the local market without the regulatory intervention
necessary to jump-start a competitive local telephone industry. This com-
mitment to jump-starting competition led to the imposition of a liability rule
that enabled new entrants to lease an incumbent's network at a wholesale rate
deeply discounted off the retail rate.' 30  Notably, this commitment repre-
sented a more aggressive role for regulatory oversight than the relatively
modest one of mandating the leasing of the "local loop" (the telephone line to
a subscriber) to new entrants or the mandate that the incumbent local pro-
vider "interconnect" its network with rival ones.
In mandating an aggressive unbundling program, Congress and the FCC
overlooked the principle that ambitious and poorly defined liability rules give
126. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
127. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 (2000).
128. See FCC First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of
the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter FCC First Report and
Order]. For a description of the subsequent fate of these rules, see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN &
PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE
INTERNET AGE 69-113 (2005).
129. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475 (2002) (upholding the FCC's
right to impose leased access requirements on incumbent telecommunications companies); AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (commenting on the 1996 Act's gross
ambiguities and noting that the 1996 Act can be interpreted to give "most promiscuous rights" to the
FCC).
130. In the jargon of telecommunications regulation, the mandated leasing of the entire network
was known as the "unbundled network element-platform" or "UNE-P." For a discussion of "UNE-
P," see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 128, at 98-108.
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rise to significant administrative costs. In particular, Congress crafted a
fairly broad standard that the FCC did not refine in a clear or effective
manner, leading to a decade of litigation over the basic terms of access.
13 1
Moreover, the FCC failed to make clear until well after the Act's passage
that unbundling requirements did not apply to newly-built facilities. 32 As a
result, incumbent telecommunications providers confronted a scenario where
they might take the entirety of the risk and be required to share some of the
rewards. Quite understandably, they argued that this state of affairs discour-
aged them from investing in new or upgraded facilities. 133  The extent to
which providers deferred investment on account of the regulatory regime
may well be unknowable; it is certainly the case that both established tele-
phone companies and new entrants made significant investments in
infrastructure during the late 1990s despite the alleged risk of undercompen-
sation during that period. 134 It is quite possible, however, that they would
have invested more under an alternative regulatory regime.
Given the combination of legal uncertainty and the possible drag on
investment resulting from the rules that the FCC put in place, the unbundling
regime of the 1996 Act represents, on almost all accounts, a policy failure.
The implementation of the 1996 Act undoubtedly consumed hundreds of
millions of dollars in costs ranging from operational investments-providing
access to legal and consultant fees-to governmental resources, and does not
appear to have achieved the goal of creating real local phone competition.
As it turned out, the most formidable source of competition to the local tele-
phone companies emerged from a competitor wholly unanticipated by the
1996 Act-broadband Internet access and its enabling of Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP).
Ironically, it is quite possible that a more focused and less ambitious
liability regime would have succeeded in promoting broadband deployment.
131. This litigation appears to have come to a close in Covad Communications Co. v. FCC,
where the D.C. Circuit wryly opened its opinion by explaining that "[b]ecause we conclude the
Commission's fourth try is a charm, we deny all of the petitions for review." 450 F.3d 528, 531
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
132. See FCC Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18
F.C.C.R. 16,978 (Aug. 21, 2003) (corrected by 18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (Sept. 17, 2003)) [hereinafter
FCC Review of Section 251 ].
133. As Henry Smith put it:
The [competitor] has an incentive to use [the incumbent's rented facilities] to the
extent they are underpriced, and to avoid taking on the risk of making timely
investments in new facilities. The [incumbent] has no incentive to make the network
attractive to the [competitor] and will be expected to underinvest in current and
improved facilities.
Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 292 (2005).
134. In fact, the Supreme Court relied on this very rationale in upholding the FCC's formula for
pricing access to unbundled network elements, concluding that "actual investment in competing
facilities since the effective date of the Act simply belies the no-stimulation" of investment
argument made by incumbent providers. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 504.
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In other countries, notably France and Japan, a more limited unbundling
mandate has indeed facilitated competition in broadband markets. 135 In those
countries, regulators focused on one specific liability rule-access to the
"high frequency" portion of the local loop. Through this policy (known as
"line sharing"), entrants in those countries were able to rely on a clearly de-
fined and effectively enforced liability rule. 136  Unfortunately, the FCC's
broad and undefined unbundling policies actually abandoned line sharing,
allowing it to get lost among a broader unbundling agenda.
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The FCC's decision to discontinue line sharing and to continue its
broader unbundling program reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of
what Henry Smith calls "semicommons" property. A semicommons is a
property regime that is owned by one firm, but where other firms enjoy le-
gally provided access (say, through liability rules). The risk of such regimes,
like the "tragedy of the commons," is that the property owner will underin-
vest in them and users will overuse them. 138  In the case of line sharing,
however, the access being provided was to the incumbent's copper networks
that had already been built and were being maintained to deliver voice
communications. In this case, as renowned regulatory economist Alfred
Kahn put it, "the sharing ... would therefore not seem to involve any dis-
couragement of future risk-taking investment."
'1 39
In short, many of the failures associated with the 1996 Act reflect the
failure to develop a stable and effective legal regime that provided unbundled
access that was truly necessary and would facilitate effective entry. In the
face of this experience, Richard Epstein can rightly underscore that liability
rules have pitfalls and may undercompensate property owners. For
policymakers, the question in future cases is whether they should follow
"Epstein's Law"-that liability rules are dangerous and should be used rarely
135. See Leila Abboud, How France Became a Leader in Offering Faster Broadband, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at B I (explaining that, as a result of France's pro-competition policies, "[o]ver
1.1 million French subscribers pay as low as E29.99 ($36) monthly for a 'triple play' package called
Free that includes 81 TV channels"); Ikeda Nobuo, The Unbundling of Network Elements: Japan's
Experience 12-15 (RIETI Discussion Paper Series 03-E-023, 2003), available at http://www.ricti.
go.jp/jp/publications/dp/03e023.pdf (explaining how, by 2003, increased competition has led to 9
million DSL customers, from a base of just 10,000 prior to the unbundling regulation); Brian
Bremner, Hard Truths for Japan's Softbank, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 9, 2004,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_32/b3895073.htm (reporting that Japan's
Yahoo BB!, which relied on line sharing, provided 10 megabits per second of broadband access at
$20 to $30 in 2004).
136. Part of the effective enforcement, however, rested on the fact that the government owned a
substantial portion of the local telephone provider that allowed access to the regulated facility. See
Nobuo, supra note 135, at 14 (noting that the Japanese government still owns 46% of NTT, the
former Japanese monopoly).
137. See FCC Review of Section 251, supra note 132.
138. See Smith, supra note 133, at 297-99; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
139. Alfred E. Kahn, Regulatory Politics as Usual, POLICY MATTERS, Mar. 2003,
http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=1 27.
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if ever--or whether the lesson is the narrower one that badly designed and
implemented liability rules are a bad idea. We are inclined to the latter view.
From the perspective of the telecommunications industry, there are a
series of lessons that emerged from the history of the 1996 Act. 40 For our
purposes, however, three particular ones bear notice: (1) liability rules should
be clearly defined; (2) liability rules should be appropriately limited so that
they do not undermine investment incentives; and (3) setting and enforcing
liability rules can be quite costly. Whether or not the 1996 Act experience
justifies Epstein's Law, it does serve as a cautionary tale about the use of li-
ability rules in instances where they are particularly generous and aspire to
effectuate major industrial policy.
B. Multiple Party Access: Comedy of the Commons or Tragedy of the
Commons?
The first question policymakers confront in evaluating the institutional
design of liability regimes is whether multiple demands on the resource in
question can be managed effectively. The answer to this question will de-
pend on the nature of the resource. As Carol Rose explained in her classic
article, certain types of property actually increase in utility on account of
common access managed through an effective governance regime. 141 Other
types of property, however, will fall victim to the "tragedy of the commons"
insofar as shared access will dissipate the incentives for maintaining the re-
source in an effective manner.
42
Where a private firm owns a resource and is required to share it, the
question is whether a sharing requirement will undermine the investment
necessary to maintain the facility. In some cases, either where the facility
requires no ongoing maintenance or will be maintained effectively on ac-
count of the owner's economic incentives, this concern may be minimal. In
particular, in cases involving IP and some uses of radio spectrum, the facility
can be shared without degrading it, 143 and so the case for the superiority of a
property rule is less compelling. In many cases involving physical facilities,
however, forced sharing raises a host of difficult management issues.
144
140. For a discussion of the 1996 Act's lessons in relation to facilitating local competition, see
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 128, at 108-13.
141. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986).
142. See Hardin, supra note 138.
143. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in
Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1191-92 (1998); Mark A. Lemley,
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004);
Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the
Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2003).
144. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-31 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing challenges of managing shared physical facilities).
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The Bidder's Edge and Hamidi cases raise particularly interesting legal
issues because they fall between the IP paradigm of a freely shareable re-
source and the real property paradigm of one that raises significant
management issues. 141 In fact, a series of interesting technology law issues
will fall into this category, including not only the cybertrespass cases but also
ones involving the unauthorized use of open wireless networks. In both
types of cases, a resource is left available for open access, but too much use
could conceivably cause overcrowding, and the owner of the facility or an
enforcement authority later challenges the use of the resources by a third
party. To date, courts have yet to adopt an effective and consistent solution
for such cases.
For cases that straddle the line between a consumable (or rivalrous)
resource and a nonrivalrous one, courts may be able to rely on private con-
duct as a barometer for whether to allow access. In the case of open wireless
networks, for example, individuals may want to share such a resource, may
well not be harmed by shared access, and may have the option of closing off
access through the use of a secured password. Consequently, absent any
showing of harm-say, through the hacking of an individual's computer
available via an open wireless network-it is reasonable to conclude that the
resource can be managed via a liability rule. Further underscoring this
conclusion, there is a general norm of open access on the Internet if a site is
not password protected.1 46 By contrast, where there is a norm of no access
(i.e., a password-protected system) and evidence of harm to the affected
individual, there is a strong case for a property rule. 147 And even if there is
not a property rule, there may be good reason for a liability rule in cases
where a bot's access to a plaintiffs servers "actually did, or threatened to,
interfere with the intended functioning of the system, as by significantly re-
ducing its available memory and processing power."
1 48
Reliance on private norms to determine the appropriateness of property
rules comes with two important caveats. First, norms between buyers and
sellers are only good barometers if they do in fact reflect agreement between
the parties. Sellers everywhere may think a rule beneficial to them is or
should be the norm, but if buyers do not share that belief it is hard to call it a
norm to which the law should defer.149 Second, there are certain types of
145. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
146. For an elaboration of the argument that access to open wireless networks should be
deemed benign and not a trespass, see Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding, and War-Driving:
Roaming Use of Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 123-30
(2004); Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving, and the
Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 39 (2004).
147. As discussed above, this regime would fall into the category of a loperty rule. See supra
note 38.
148. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306 (Cal. 2003).
149. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1257, 1276 (1998). For a discussion of the use of norms in setting commercial rules
governing information, see David McGowan, Recognizing Usages of Trade: A Case Study from
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conduct, such as the use of copyrighted work for purposes of creating a
parody, that the law privileges because even though very few people engage
in it, the social benefits those few confer are substantial. In such a case, most
sellers and buyers might happily agree to a rule banning parodies because
they do not intend to make parodies. But such a norm should not be enforced
in the law. Rather, the law properly protects those few people who want to
engage in creating parodies because doing so is judged to be socially benefi-
cial conduct.
C. Information Costs and Managing Forced Sharing Arrangements
In a number of cases involving IP and even some involving radio
spectrum (including open wireless networks), the liability rule provides ac-
cess for free. The virtue of a zero-price rule is that it is easy to calculate and
a court can administer such a regime without difficulty. In some cases,
moreover, such as access to servers on the World Wide Web or interconnec-
tion between rival telecommunications networks, free access will even
approximate the reciprocal benefits from cooperation absent market power or
strategic behavior concerns. In an array of cases, however, including those
involving patent and copyright infringement, free access would undermine
investment incentives and thus should be denied. In those cases, adminis-
tering a liability rule requires a court or agency to set a price, and the case for
liability rules is substantially weakened if a reasonable rate for access cannot
be determined.
Whether or not a court or agency can confidently set the right price for a
liability rule may depend on whether existing transactions provide a valid
benchmark. If a copyright owner sells a particular work to all comers at a set
price, a court should be reasonably comfortable in estimating the level of
damages from an unauthorized use, just as courts in contract cases are willing
to imply a price term where there is a thick market for a particular good.
150
By contrast, where the good is one that has never been the subject of a mar-
ket transaction, courts are flying blind in trying to set a price that adequately
compensates the IP owner.
Antitrust monopolization cases provide a helpful analogy for
understanding this issue. In antitrust, the case for subjecting a resource to a
compulsory license is increasingly controversial, and courts no longer
Electronic Commerce, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 167 (2002). For a general analysis of when IP
rules should defer to industry custom, see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in
Intellectual Property (Feb. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://law.wustl.edu/Faculty/index.
asp?id=876.
150. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1977) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."); see also Ryan v. Wersi Elecs. GmbH
& Co., 3 F.3d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The UCC does recognize generally that courts may imply
reasonable price terms .... ").
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impose them as a common remedy. 151 As former Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Makan Delrahim put it, "for antitrust enforcers, licensing is not what
we would call our 'core competence."", 152 This reluctance follows the general
antitrust law admonition against the imposition of a duty to deal on a
monopolist. Notably, as the Supreme Court recently explained in its Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP decision, this
admonition reflects both the principle that firms should be encouraged to deal
with rivals (or not) as they see fit as well as that "the cost of false positives
counsels against an undue expansion" of any such requirement.'
53
The antitrust admonition against compulsory dealing arrangements has
two significant exceptions relevant to IP and technology policy more
generally. First, antitrust law recognizes an exception to the Trinko
principle-articulated most clearly in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp. 154 -that where a firm enters into a dealing arrangement selec-
tively so as to exclude would-be efficient competitors from the market,
antitrust liability may be appropriate. In Aspen Skiing, a firm owning three
local ski mountains declined to continue a four-mountain pass in Aspen
while continuing such arrangements in other areas where it owned only one
of the relevant mountains. 5 5  With such a clear indication that a firm's re-
fusal to deal reflected an exclusionary purpose and the presence of a reliable
benchmark to define the appropriate terms of dealing, the Supreme Court
concluded that a mandated duty to deal was appropriate.1
56
15 1. Despite the current level of skepticism of such arrangements, the previous use of
compulsory licensing arrangements did not appear to result in an adverse impact on innovation. See
F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 457 (2d ed.
1980) ("All in all, the substantial amount of evidence now available suggests that compulsory patent
licensing, judiciously confined to cases in which patent-based monopoly power has been
abused... would have little or no adverse impact on the rate of technological progress ....");
Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 passim (2003) (contending that
only licenses that are both predictable and threaten a significant market adversely impact investment
in innovation).
152. Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Forcing Firms To Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights and
Antitrust, Presentation at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (May 10,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.pdf.
153. 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004). On the concern that a duty to deal would hamper investment
incentives, see id. at 407-08, which states that forced sharing "is in some tension with the
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival,
or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities." See also United States v. Aluminum
Co., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins.").
154. 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (stating that if a firm excludes rivals on a nonefficiency basis,
the firm's behavior can be characterized as predatory).
155. Id. at 604.
156. Id. at 610-11 (affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals that Aspen Skiing Company
violated § 2 of the Sherman Act for refusing to cooperate with its smaller rival). Another such
antitrust action was the Federal Trade Commission's case against Intel, which called for Intel not to
restrict access to its IP on a selective basis so as to prevent potential rivals from developing
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The second principal exception to the reluctance of antitrust courts to
mandate a duty to deal involves cases where the limited institutional compe-
tence of an antitrust court can be compensated for by the presence of a
regulatory body. In Trinko, as one of us has argued elsewhere, the Court
suggested that it might be willing to endorse a strong (and unfortunate) ver-
sion of this rule-i.e., where a regulatory agency possesses authority,
antitrust courts should defer completely to that authority. 57 This rule,
however, might more reasonably be applied in a weaker form-where a
regulatory agency is competent to superintend an access remedy, antitrust
courts should not hesitate to impose liability under a duty to deal
requirement, but should defer remedial oversight to that body.1 58 In short,
when confronted with a claim asking for a compulsory access requirement,
courts are generally and properly reluctant to develop the relevant terms of
dealing from whole cloth. Thus, if no regulatory agency is competent to su-
perintend a remedy and no benchmark exists, antitrust courts generally reject
a duty-to-deal claim as irremediable.
Courts adjudicating IP cases may sometimes be in a better position than
their antitrust counterparts to allow access to a bottleneck resource.
Consider, for example, the set of cases involving claims that a firm illegally
reverse engineered a protected interface and should be denied access. In
such cases, there is no need to develop a remedial regime to facilitate access
because, in the absence of a judicial order barring access, the reverse engi-
neered interface will be open. In some cases, courts have adopted a rule
allowing categorical access for all,1 59 but, as one of us has argued, 60 there is
a risk that such a rule will sweep too broadly and undermine investment
innovative technologies that could ultimately complete with Intel. See In re Intel Corp., No. 9288,
1999 WL 164046 (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (agreement containing consent order), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/dO9288intelagreement.htm. Notably, the consent decree that
settled that case allowed Intel to use its IP selectively and strategically (i.e., to withhold access to it
or to sue for infringement) if a rival protected by the decree attempted to use its IP in an action
seeking an injunction. Id. By so doing, the decree both addressed the concern that Intel was using
its IP rights in a strategic manner that hurt competition and protected Intel against the threat that it
might be subject to an action whereby a threatened injunction sought greater royalties than would be
reasonable based on the market value of the technology in question.
157. Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship ofAntitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era, 50
ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 563 (2005) ("In the wake of Trinko, the case for the categorical version of
the Town of Concord principle-i.e., if any regulatory authority enjoys jurisdiction, antitrust courts
must stay their hand-remains plausible, but difficult to make.").
158. See id. at 584 (suggesting that the remedial strategy used in other antitrust cases, "relying
on a regulatory agenda to superintend a particular remedy," was "very effective"); Philip J. Weiser,
Goldwasser, the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 15
(2003) (suggesting that "antitrust courts can and should craft remedies that are not only sensitive to,
but may well rely on the presence of an existing regulatory regime").
159. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 608 (9th Cir.
2000) (adopting an approach that broadly privileges reverse engineering as a fair use).
160. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 534, 583-84 (2003).
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incentives.16  Nonetheless, there are likely to be a great number of cases
where the developer of a product will have realized considerable gains and
will seek to bar access to a protected interface solely to safeguard its domi-
nant position in the marketplace. 1
62
To appreciate the challenge of developing an appropriate access regime
as part of IP litigation, let us return to the Perfect 10 decision. In that case,
the plaintiff (Perfect 10) claimed that the purported fair use-an image
search-deprived it of otherwise available licensing revenue because a mar-
ket existed for thumbnail images of the pornographic pictures that could be
found using Google's search engine. In particular, Perfect 10 provided evi-
dence that it engages in the "worldwide sale and distribution of Perfect 10
reduced-size copyrighted images for download and use on cell phones, it has
sold, on average, approximately 6,000 images per month in the United
Kingdom."1 63 Thus, the court concluded that "to the extent that users may
choose to download free images to their phone rather than purchase Perfect
10's reduced-size images, Google's use supersedes Perfect 10'S.' ' 164 Despite
concluding that Google's display of similar thumbnail images was a trans-
formative use of the copyrighted work because it enabled consumers to
search for content on the World Wide Web, the Perfect 10 court ruled that
Perfect 10 was entitled to an injunction preventing Google from displaying
Perfect 10's content via its Web search.
As we discussed above, Perfect 10 represents a plausible case of holdup
type behavior that could be averted by the use of a liability rule. 165 Since it
would be quite difficult for Google to develop a system for filtering out
Perfect 10's pictures from its image search, a legal ruling in favor of Perfect
10 gives it an opportunity to negotiate a fee far above the value of any injury
it suffered. Alternatively, if the parties did not settle and the injunction was
enforced, the result of that bargaining breakdown would be economically
inefficient. In the case of Perfect 10, however, there is a basis for calculating
an appropriate damage award-the negotiated rate Perfect 10 actually
charges for the thumbnail images made available for downloading, times any
sales Perfect 10 can show it lost because of Google thumbnails. Moreover,
as a legal matter, courts adjudicating copyright cases are not required to im-
pose injunctions. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, "the goals
161. Id. (stating that such a pure-commons model, though promoting innovation, limits
investment incentives). In particular, the general limiting principle is that "no access right
demanded by competitors should be granted if that right would, if granted ex ante, have led the
owner of the facility (real or virtual, as in the case of a network of subscribers) not to build the
facilities in the first place or would otherwise impair its use." Weiser, supra note 158, at 12-13.
Whether the reverse engineering cases meet this test is an empirical question, one on which the
authors do not necessarily agree.
162. Weiser, supra note 160, at 591-92.
163. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
164. Id. at 849.
165. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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of the copyright law.., are not always best served by automatically granting
injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of
fair use.,
166
Unfortunately, there is both a legal and practical challenge for courts
like the Perfect 10 court to use a liability rule in lieu of a property rule. On
the legal front, courts are not authorized to award monetary damages based
on a reasonableness standard. Rather, the Copyright Act specifies that
statutory damages are available. 167 In cases like Perfect 10, where a search
engine might copy a large number of works, those damages (ranging from
$200 to $150,000 per copied work)168 add up in a hurry. On the practical
side, the challenge for a court developing an appropriate liability rule is that
not every thumbnail image of the protected work that appears in a search
result will substitute for an actual licensing opportunity. In the case of
Perfect 10, many of the thumbnail images that appeared in search results
might never have been obtained by individuals otherwise open to purchasing
such images for download. In a sense, the damage calculation here-i.e.,
approximating the truly lost licensing revenue-is similar to the challenge of
evaluating the impact of pirated music over peer-to-peer networks on music
sales. 169  Such a calculation is doable, to be sure, but not without some
difficulty.
Given the legal and practical limitations, courts are understandably
often drawn to the zero-priced access version of a liability rule traditionally
embodied by the fair use principle. Even in applying the fair use doctrine,
courts are able to craft doctrines that impose certain responsibilities on those
using copyrights for transformative and worthwhile purposes. In the Second
Circuit's decision in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,17° for
example, the court identified just such a doctrine, ruling that fair use pro-
tected the use of seven copyrighted images in a coffee table book that
166. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) ("[Ijt hardly follows from today's decision [finding
infringement] that an injunction... must issue."); Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20,
24 (1908) ("[W]e think the discretion of the court was wisely exercised in refusing an injunction
and remitting the appellants to a court of law to recover such damage as they might there
prove .... ); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying injunctive relief
after a finding of copyright infringement), affd, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (leaving undisturbed the
appellate court's remedial analysis); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1105, 1132 (1990) (arguing that, where there is a "strong public interest in the publication of
the secondary work [and] the copyright owner's interest may be adequately protected by an award
of damages for whatever infringement is found," courts should withhold injunctive relief).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000).
168. Id. § 504(c)(2).
169. As a number of commentators have explained, it is plainly not the case that every illegal
download substitutes for a lawful sale. See, e.g., ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., DIGITAL
BROADBAND CONTENT: Music 76-78 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/2/
34995041.pdf.
170. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
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detailed a cultural history of the Grateful Dead.171 In its decision, the Second
Circuit underscored that a modification of the original images to make them
less valuable represented an important consideration in denying a claim for
infringement.1
7 2
In short, the case for liability rules often rests on a premise that the
critical information necessary for valuation can be collected effectively and
an appropriate price can be set with reasonable certainty. This type of sce-
nario is likely to arise when there is a clearly identifiable case of holdup and
market-based benchmark arrangements provide a reliable guide for the ap-
propriate price. In some cases, particularly copyright, the problem is not just
identifying the right price but fitting that price into the statutory damages
scheme. Consequently, any use of a liability rule in copyright (other than the
zero-priced rule of the fair use variety) will require Congress to revisit the
current statutory damages rules. 
173
The challenge of setting the terms of access in the face of uncertainty is,
in many respects, the Achilles' heel of the case for liability rules. As Henry
Smith explains, defenders of liability rules will often downplay the impact of
uncertainty.1 74 They might, for example, suggest that unknown information
will not affect the overall judgment as to the nature of the liability rule in
question.1 75 Smith challenges this assumption and argues that property rules,
which rely on the property owner to evaluate the relevant unknown
circumstances, reflect a sound delegation strategy as property owners are
more likely to judge those circumstances effectively. 
76
Despite the criticism of developing a liability rule without a clear
benchmark, there are still certain cases where regulatory bodies should step
in to develop and enforce access regimes that courts cannot manage
effectively, because property rules are worse still. The quintessential case for
a liability rule managed by a regulator rather than a court is that (1) holdup or
strategic behavior based on the scope of the property rule makes it unlikely
that the parties themselves will arrive at an appropriate price, and (2) the
regulator is in a position to obtain and process the necessary information to
171. Id. at 615.
172. As the court explained, "While the small size is sufficient to permit readers to recognize
the historical significance of the posters, it is inadequate to offer more than a glimpse of their
expressive value. In short, DK used the minimal image size necessary to accomplish its
transformative purpose." Id. at 611. The court underscored this point later in the opinion,
explaining that "had the book been commercially successful-which it was not-it might have
garnered interest in the original images in full size because the reduced images have such minimal
expressive impact." Id. at 614 n.5.
173. For elaboration of this problem, and suggestions for how to solve it, see Lemley, supra
note 50 (manuscript at 22-29).
174. Smith, supra note 37, at 1725-26.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1781 ("Property rules are most called for where an entrepreneurial owner, broadly
defined, is good at gathering information cost-effectively but results are not verifiable (entrepreneur
makes bets), but a potential taker is good at informationally free-riding on the entrepreneur.").
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set an appropriate price. Consider, for example, the case of overseeing the
interconnection of rival telecommunications networks. Left to the market
alone, where each network provider enjoys a property right to exclude traffic
from its network, the incumbent firm will-as Richard Epstein put it-"have
every incentive to guard access to their networks against their would-be
competitors."' 177  Consequently, without a third party to set the terms and
conditions of interconnection, entry into such markets would be
impossible. 178
For cases where a third party must develop terms of access without the
benefit of clear benchmarks, we think that regulatory agencies such as the
FCC rather than courts are in the best position to collect the information nec-
essary to develop the relevant access arrangements. 79  In the case of
overseeing interconnection arrangements, for example, the effort of New
Zealand's courts to do just that stands as a powerful reminder of the institu-
tional limitations of courts. 180  It was precisely the lack of any available
benchmark that left those courts unable to craft effective access arrangements
for the parties.181 Not only can regulatory agencies collect the information
necessary for access arrangements in the absence of prior benchmarks, they
can experiment with different institutional strategies, such as cooperating
with standard-setting bodies to develop interconnection standards. 82  Over
time, or in conjunction with regulatory bodies, it is quite possible that anti-
trust courts can also play an effective role in overseeing interconnection, but
they are generally unable to do so without the benefit of clear benchmarks or
precedents.
83
177. Epstein, supra note 21, at 2119-20.
178. See Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and
Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 127 (2005) ("[M]ultiple firms can compete
only if some institutional arrangements make it certain that traffic originating on one network can
be carried onto another network and vice versa.").
179. See Weiser, supra note 157, at 559-60 (contending that regulatory agencies possess
superior competence over antitrust courts in the area of managing complex access arrangements and
that courts are ill suited for that role because they lack the ability to gather the necessary
information); see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 128, at 69-113.
180. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
34 (2000) (concluding that the New Zealand case makes clear the "difficulty of ensuring
competition in the absence of regulation"); Mary Newcomer Williams, Comparative Analysis of
Telecommunications Regulation: Pitfalls and Opportunities, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 269, 277 (2003);
see also Michel Kerf et al., Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?
3 (Feb. 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=886292 (reporting
that "[i]nterconnection issues have, in many cases, been difficult to solve through antitrust").
181. Michel Kerf et al., Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: A Close Look at
Interconnection 1-4 (Feb. 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id =
886305.
182. For a discussion of this point, see Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 112, at 689-90, and see
generally Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY.
L. REV. 822 (2001).
183. As Kerf, Neto, and G~radin noted,
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D. Dealing with Technological Dynamism and Changing Circumstances
The final consideration for whether to institute a liability rule is whether
the terms of access can be devised in a manner that will be effective in the
face of technological change. In the case of technologically dynamic
industries, managing forced sharing requirements can be difficult, particu-
larly for generalist courts not institutionally well situated to oversee complex
and changing access arrangements. 184 Unlike regulatory agencies, which are
authorized to continue revising rules and their oversight regime, courts "have
difficulty investigating underlying circumstances-particularly changes in
circumstances-because they depend upon a record, produced through an
adversarial process, for their information."'
' 85
To the extent that courts rather than regulators need to be the ones to
implement a liability regime, as in at least some patent and copyright cases,
their institutional limitations counsel strongly for case-by-case adjudication
that does not rely on categorical remedial arrangements. Rather, following
the general equitable model of the four-part standard for injunctions, 1 86 courts
should develop and impose only rules carefully tailored to and based on the
facts of a given case. This model, while costly compared to the regulatory
agency's use of industry-wide rulemakings, has the benefit of allowing pri-
vate arrangements to develop flexibly. By contrast, the regulatory model
threatens to displace all such arrangements and raise the stakes by using an
omnibus rulemaking that invites rent-seeking behavior.
In addition to the rent-seeking concern, the development of liability
rules presents notable challenges for regulatory bodies or courts that must
acquire the necessary information to keep their rules current in the face of
an antitrust-based system may progressively become more appropriate to solve
interconnection pricing issues when sufficient experience has been gained in setting
such prices under a sector-specific regime. With various interconnection agreements
already in place, antitrust authorities would have benchmarks, or precedents, to set
interconnection prices themselves. And once antitrust authorities are seen as credible
and predictable regulators, operators would be more likely to come to agreements on
their own accord.
Kerfet al., supra note 181, at 5.
184. As Posner relates:
We deal with technical questions in the judiciary not by having judges or jurors who
have the requisite technical knowledge or by giving them technical assistants, but by
having technical experts present evidence which the judge and jury (if it is a jury case)
are expected somehow to assimilate. This system does not work as badly as its critics
maintain; but the more technical the area of litigation and the fewer experts are
disinterested, the worse it is apt to work. Computer science and communications
technology are much more difficult areas than the average body of scientific or
engineering knowledge that lay judges and jurors are asked to absorb en route to
rendering a decision.
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 937 (2001).
185. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Deregulation in the United States: Airlines,
Telecommunications and Antitrust, in DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION? 7, 44-45
(Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
186. See supra note 75.
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technological change. One strategy for this challenge is to institute a contin-
gent liability rule or, in the words of Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky, a "pliability rule."' 87  In the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Congress attempted to restrict the availability of unbundled network
elements using such an approach; in particular, it provided that unbundled
access to the incumbent's network (i.e., the liability rule) should only be
available under certain circumstances. 188 In practice, however, this form of
restricted access did not work effectively, in part because of continuing legal
uncertainty and litigation.
The Communications Act (which is amended by the 1996 Act) does
provide for two reasonably successful procedural strategies (or "soft
pliability rules") to ensure that liability rules remain available only so long as
necessary. The first requires periodic reviews of established access
regulations. Under this requirement, the FCC must periodically revisit
whether regulations once justified by market circumstances should remain in
place.' 89  The second strategy is to offer regulated firms the option of
petitioning for regulatory forbearance and calling for such petitions, if not
acted upon, to be deemed approved by the agency.' 90 The advantage of these
procedural strategies is that they call for ongoing scrutiny and provide judi-
cial review over agency decisions to maintain liability regimes. They do not,
however, provide any limiting standard per se, but rather only seek to ensure
that a once justified liability rule is still appropriate.
The concept of a liability rule being limited to certain circumstances is,
in principle, a desirable means of adapting to changing market
circumstances, but policymakers should take heed from the 1996 Act exam-
ple that this approach can go awry. In particular, policymakers should learn
the lesson that it is critical that any limiting circumstance be specifically and
187. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 38, at 5.
188. The 1996 Act calls for access to unbundled network elements when "the failure to provide
access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking
access to provide the services that it seeks to offer." 47 U.S.C. § 25 1(d)(2)(B) (2000) (emphasis
added). As the Supreme Court explained, the essential message of the "impairment standard" is that
the lack of access must do more than place the entrant at a slight disadvantage and that this standard
must limit entrants' access to unbundled elements; in particular, the Court interpreted this standard
as requiring the FCC to evaluate whether, without the forced leasing requirement, an entrant would
be able to provide a rival service on a reasonably effective basis. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388-92 (1999). Notably, the Court explained that "the Commission's
assumption that any increase in cost (or decrease in quality) imposed by denial of a network element
renders access to that element 'necessary,' and causes the failure to provide that element to 'impair'
the entrant's ability to furnish its desired services, is simply not in accord with the ordinary and fair
meaning of those terms." Id. at 389-90.
189. See, e.g., Report and Order, Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, 17 F.C.C.R. 12,124, 12,125 4 (2002) (concluding that the so-called
"program access rules" should remain in place).
190. This novel procedure is still being incorporated into the regulatory system. In 2004, for
example, the D.C. Circuit rebuked the FCC for failing to follow the prescribed deadline governing
forbearance petitions. See Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 374 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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carefully delineated-either in the statutory language or implementing
regulations-to avoid ongoing legal uncertainty and further rent seeking.
Significantly, even the "essential facilities" principle invoked by Bell and
Parchomovsky, and suggested by some as an effective restriction for unbun-
dled access in the 1996 Act context, might require further refinement to serve
as an effective pliability rule. 191 After all, Professor Areeda famously com-
plained that this standard is an "epithet in need of limiting principles."'1 92 To
be sure, any legal standard will allow for some flexibility and uncertainty in
its application, but some standards fare worse than others on this score.
To avoid some of the invariable haggling associated with a legal
standard that limits the availability of a liability rule, policymakers can opt
for a categorical limitation on a liability rule. A quintessential example of
such a limitation is the use of a "sunset provision." Under this model, for
example, the availability of certain unbundled network elements might be
limited by a term of years. The sunset approach has the virtue of enabling
incumbent providers to benefit from a property rule over the long term by
providing only a short window of opportunity for entrants to lease parts of
their network. Significantly, such a regime provides clear signals to entrants
that they can only rely on unbundled access for a certain period of time be-
fore they must invest in their own facilities. To work effectively, however,
the term of the liability rule must be extendable to address situations where
the regulated parties fail to abide by the relevant requirements.,93
V. Compulsory Licenses and Institutional Competence Questions
Reconsidered
As we explained at the outset, copyright scholars focus considerably
more attention on the judicially developed fair use doctrine than the congres-
sionally developed regime of compulsory licenses. 194  With the increased
calls for compulsory licenses in the Internet context, there has been more
191. For Bell and Parchomovsky's discussion of the essential facilities doctrine, see Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 38, at 35-38. For a suggestion that this doctrine could have been used to
govern unbundled access to incumbent telecommunications networks, see U.S. Telecom Ass'n v.
FCC, 290 F.3d 415,427 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
192. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1989); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
§ 7.7 (3d ed. 2005) ("The so-called 'essential facility' doctrine is one of the most troublesome,
incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2 liability. The antitrust world would almost
certainly be a better place if it were jettisoned ....").
193. The Microsoft consent decree offers an example. There, the district court extended the
consent decree for two additional years on the grounds that Microsoft had moved "too slowly in
delivering technical documentation to rivals licensing its Windows communication protocols." See
Anne Broache, Judge Adds Two Years to Microsoft Antitrust Deal, CNET NEWS.COM, May 17,
2006, http://news.com.com/2102-10123-6073250.html.
194. For an important exception, see generally Wu, supra note 43, in which the author
describes the use of compulsory licenses as the "classic regime" of copyright law and chronicles the
history of their use.
[Vol. 85t783
2007] Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?
attention paid to this issue, but scholars still have not developed a careful
explanation of what circumstances justify such administrative initiatives.
Thus, after discussing compulsory licensing regimes and the criteria for their
effectiveness, this Part evaluates the relative advantages of courts and agen-
cies in managing liability regimes.
A. Compulsory Licenses: The Copyright Experience
As we noted above, the use of compulsory licenses in copyright law
reflects a classic form of a liability rule. The modem music industry, for
example, is heavily dependent on compulsory licenses. 195 Nonetheless, rela-
tively few scholars have evaluated the rationality of the current system and
whether it tracks the principles set out above. 196 This lack of scrutiny might
help to explain why copyright's system of compulsory licenses is fraught
with difficulties and fails to appreciate some of the principles discussed
above.
The development of compulsory licenses in the music industry has
emerged as an alternative remedial scheme in copyright law, which generally
limits courts to an either-or choice when it comes to allowing access to a
copyrighted work. As we discussed above in connection with the fair use
doctrine, courts hearing copyright cases must either deem uses
"infringing"-and subject to statutory damages-or "noninfringing"-so that
the use of the copyrighted work is not subject to any form of compensation to
the copyright holder. 197 In a number of leading cases, the courts have sided
with the would-be infringing technology, spurring Congress to address the
apparent inequity of access without payment by enacting a compulsory
license. 98 In other words, Congress has endorsed the concept of a liability
rule in a wide range of technologies, concluding that a full property right
would either raise serious transaction costs concerns 1 99 or would be abused to
prevent the development of the new technology. 00
195. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114, 115 (2000).
196. For one such exception, see Michael Botein & Edward Samuels, Compulsory Licenses in
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Workable Solution?, 30 S. ILL. L.J. 69 (2005). This Article, like
several other recent ones, reflects the increased interest in the topic spurred by calls to adopt a
compulsory licensing model writ large to address Internet peer-to-peer file sharing. See FISHER III,
supra note 53 (arguing in favor of such a solution); cf Netanel, supra note 53, at 31 (examining
compulsory licenses as "useful precedent" for a proposed noncommercial use levy, or NUL).
197. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
199. In enacting a compulsory licensing regime requiring broadcasters to allow access to their
TV programs, Congress concluded that "it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require
every cable system to negotiate [appropriate royalty payments] with every copyright owner" in
order to secure consent for such retransmissions. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704.
200. Such a regime can also be justified as necessary to enable the development of a new
technology that might otherwise be squashed by an established one. In the case of the development
of cable television, for example, broadcasters initially refused to cooperate with cable television
Texas Law Review
The pattern of judicial decisions followed by legislative reaction first
emerged in the famous case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co.20 1 In that case, the plaintiff, who owned copyrights on sheet music,
claimed that the use of that music in player pianos constituted copyright
infringement.2 °2 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the
copyrights only covered the visual reproduction of the sheet music and not
the auditory performance of it. 203 In response, Congress instituted a statutory
license (codified at § 115 of the Copyright Act) that authorized all comers to
perform copyrighted works, but required payment to the holder of the copy-
right of the composition.0 4 Consequently, for example, when the owner of
the player piano uses it to play music, he or she is subject to the White-Smith-
inspired statutory license and must pay the music composer a licensing fee.
The White-Smith pattern has repeated itself in a number of different
contexts and, as a result, the Copyright Act has become more complicated as
technology has evolved.0 5 In the case of music played over the radio, musi-
cal composers-but not the artist who performed the work-are rewarded
through a privately developed clearinghouse system administered by ASCAP
and BMI.206 In the face of a copyright regime that protected only the musical
composition and not the recorded performance, the record companies pushed
for the right to control performances of their recorded works (and charge an
additional royalty), but Congress largely kept the status quo in place for
providers (who they viewed as a competitor in the distribution market), challenging in court their
right to carry their popular channels and advocating regulations that would slow the technology's
growth. See Wu, supra note 43, at 311-24. In other contexts, it may simply be the case that the
absence of a compulsory license regime would disproportionately impact the new entrant, placing it
at an unfair disadvantage. See FTC, In re Satellite Carrier Compulsory License; Definition of
Unserved Household, Reply Comments of The Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 1998), available
at http://www.flc.gov/be/v980004.htm ("The transaction costs of acquiring broadcast programming
for DBS distribution would thus likely be higher than for the other, established distribution
technologies.").
201. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
202. Id. at 8-9.
203. Id. at 17-18.
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
205. The nuances of this pattern have differed and there is room for disagreement on exactly
what characterized the pattern. Compare Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New
Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (2001) (viewing the courts as protecting
copyright owner participation in new methods of dissemination, while not enabling owners to
eliminate those methods of dissemination), with Wu, supra note 43 (finding a change in the courts'
attitude after the 1976 Copyright Act towards greater enforcement of an owner's rights to prevent
new methods of dissemination).
206. This state of affairs resulted from a series of cases between radio stations and record
companies. This litigation and attendant congressional oversight ultimately led to a privately
negotiated solution where the music industry developed a clearinghouse system (i.e., ASCAP and
BMI) to afford access to musical works-under the oversight of an antitrust consent decree. For a
discussion of this history, see Wu, supra note 43, at 306-11.
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many years.20 7 Before the digital technology revolution, this status quo
worked reasonably well, as the recording and radio industries coexisted in a
symbiotic relationship whereby airplay actually spurred greater demand for
the purchase of records.20 8
The rise of digital technology has spurred Congress to revisit the long
established system that governed access to copyrighted music. In 1992, in
anticipation of the development of digital audio tapes, Congress enacted the
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), which both instituted a compulsory
licensing regime based on levies on the digital technology and mandated the
use of a copy protection system that would prevent unauthorized
reproductions. 2 9 Given that Congress targeted a specific technology (digital
audio tapes) and that this statute does not apply more broadly (say, to MP3
players that make digital copies),210 it has been largely a dead letter and has
created more administrative costs than it has delivered licensing benefits to
the music industry.211 Next, in 1995, Congress passed the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA) to give copy-
right owners a digital audio transmission performance right.2 12 Congress did
not provide a full IP right in sound recordings, however. Rather, it instituted
a new compulsory licensing regime distinct from and additional to the license
regime as to the musical composition.
In the wake of the key statutory revisions, § 114 of the Copyright Act
called for the recording industry to negotiate with firms providing the nonin-
207. In 1971, Congress did amend the Copyright Act to provide a limited copyright in the
reproduction of sound recordings. See Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140,
85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114-116 (2000)).
208. As one court observed, "The recording industry and broadcasters existed in a sort of
symbiotic relationship wherein the recording industry recognized that radio airplay was free
advertising that lured consumers to retail stores where they would purchase recordings." Bonneville
Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487-88 (3d Cir. 2003). Indeed, as the court noted, the symbiotic
relationship is a nuanced one, as-record companies will often seek to pay radio stations for airtime
(in the form of payola). Id. at 488 n.3. But see Stan J. Liebowitz, Don't Play It Again Sam: Radio
Play, Record Sales, and Property Rights 13-19 (Jan. 5 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=956527 (collecting data suggesting this may no
longer be true).
209. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000).
210. RJAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
211. Botein & Samuels, supra note 196, at 74 (noting limited fees paid into this system and
criticizing its effectiveness).
212. See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106);
see also Botein & Samuels, supra note 196, at 74 (stating that the DPRA created a limited sound
recording performance right). In 1998, Congress further refined this regime in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 104(d)) (DMCA). In particular, the DMCA expanded the scope of DPRA, limiting the
scope of exemptions from it. That limitation, however, still left open the possibility that a radio
broadcaster transmitting its signals both over conventional radio technology and over the Internet
could avoid the payment of the additional license. The Copyright Office rejected this argument and
the Third Circuit affirmed its conclusion that AM and FM radio broadcasters are subject to the same
licensing requirement as their stand-alone webcasting counterparts. See Bonneville, 347 F.3d at
499-500.
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teractive digital transmission of music-entities popularly known as
"webcasters." In the event that the parties could not reach an agreement, the
Act called on the Copyright Office to convene a "Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel"-appropriately known as a "CARP" 213 -to set a "reasonable
rate, 21 4 which it defined as "rates and terms that most clearly represent the
rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between
a willing buyer and a willing seller., 215 With the exception of a single ar-
rangement negotiated between Yahoo! and the RIAA, however, the
webcasters and music industry failed to reach any agreements. Finally, after
approximately $25 million in litigation costs, 216 the CARP set a rate for ac-
cess of $.0007 for simultaneous AM/FM and webcasting versus a $.0014 rate
for stand-alone webcasters, rejecting the webcasters' pleas for a revenue-
based assessment and relying heavily on the Yahoo!-RIAA deal.217
The CARP decision set off a fervor in the webcasting community.
Concluding that the disparate treatment for stand-alone webcasters was un-
supported and that the CARP drew improper inferences from the Yahoo!
agreement, the Librarian of Congress took the unusual step of overruling the
CARP and instituting a rate of $.0007 for all webcasters (whether or not they
simultaneously acted as radio broadcasters). 218 Even this decision left the
219webcasting community upset and drove many webcasters out of business.
In response, Congress overrode the Librarian's decision by enacting the
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,220 which called for lower rates by
authorizing individual negotiations for small webcasters and providing the
option of royalties based on a percentage of revenue or expenses and a mini-
mum payment. 221  Finally, to address the concern that the old model of
setting compulsory licenses was fundamentally flawed, Congress passed the
213. The more logical name would have been a "Copyright Royalty Arbitration Panel," but
avid abbreviators will understand why Congress was reluctant to choose this name.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(l)(A)(2000).
215. Id. § 114(f)(2)(B).
216. Philip S. Corwin, Outlook for Copyright and Digital Media Legislation in the 108th
Congress, 11 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 98, 113 (2003).
217. Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,243 (July 8, 2002); accord U.S.
Copyright Office, Webcasting Determination: Summary of the Determination of the Librarian of
Congress on Rates and Terms for Webcasting and Ephemeral Recordings (Feb. 24, 2003),
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-ratesfinal.html.
218. 37 C.F.R. § 261.3 (2006).
219. Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill the Podcasting Star?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161,
178 (2005).
220. Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)).
221. Astle, supra note 219, at 178. In the wake of this law, small webcasters soon reached an
agreement with the recording industry that offered them the option of paying eight percent of their
gross revenue or five percent of their total expenses in lieu of the rate set by the CARP. See
Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,510
(Dec. 24, 2002).
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Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004,222 abolishing the
CARP and instituting a new system using Copyright Royalty Judges.223
B. Lessons for Compulsory Licensing Regimes
Compulsory copyright regimes are liability rules administered by an
agency. As Congress begins to consider adding more such regimes, or re-
224*vising the existing ones, it is critical that it take to heart a set of lessons
about the potential pitfalls of such regimes. In particular, we identify four
principles that should guide the development of such regimes: (1) minimize
the opportunity for rent-seeking behavior; (2) avoid technology-based dis-
tinctions that will lead to artificial categories and distort the marketplace; (3)
encourage private bargaining even in the face of an established liability rule;
and (4) ensure that a liability rule is set based on a true benchmark.
1. Minimize the Opportunity for Rent-Seeking Behavior.-The classic
description of rent-seeking is that regulated firms that benefit from
government-set rules are likely to invest in the preservation of such rules.
Stated broadly, the analysis of rent-seeking behavior is that "taxes, subsidies,
regulations, and other political instruments" will regularly be "used to raise
the welfare of more influential pressure groups. '225  In some cases, two
equally matched sides can use a regulatory process to substitute for a busi-
ness negotiation that, for any number of reasons, may be difficult to engineer.
Such a process can be difficult, lengthy, and cumbersome, as the webcasting
example demonstrates. By contrast, if only one side is well organized, the
setting of royalty rates may well prove to be a boon to that side.226
In short, the challenge for any regulatorily-devised compulsory
licensing regime is to prevent such a regime from becoming a rent-seeking
222. Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (2004) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 801).
223. See id. Ironically, the CARPs themselves had replaced an older system of administrative
law judges not too different from the new Copyright Royalty Judges.
224. One such reform-deemed the "Platform Equality and Remedies for Rights Holders in
Music Act of 2006" (i.e., the PERFORM Act of 2006)-was recently considered by Congress. S.
2644, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/s2644-109.pdf.
225. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 373-74 (1983).
226. Emphasizing this point, Tom Nachbar suggests that no upstart industry can ever expect to
benefit from a compulsory licensing regime:
Given the history of market regulation, it is passing strange for some to now argue that
government price controls are necessary in order to enable the introduction of new
technologies of content dissemination. Such a statement is self-falsifying; truly "new"
technologies have no one to advocate for them in the political process.
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REv. 1313,
1374-75 (2005). Nachbar's point, which is a powerful critique of government action in this area,
does not necessarily suggest that property rules are superior to liability rules, as property rules can
also be designed to favor established firms. Moreover, Nachbar's point challenges Epstein's
suggestion that liability rules will necessarily undercompensate incumbents; Nachbar's concern is
the opposite.
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orgy. Notably, because petitioning the government for regulation and the
subsequent government action are immune from antitrust oversight, 227 it is
plausible that a concentrated and influential industry can use a compulsory
licensing system to establish and maintain monopoly profits they could not
achieve with a property rule. By contrast, private clearinghouse systems are
subject to antitrust oversight and are thus potentially less susceptible to such
behavior.228
2. Avoid Technology-Based Distinctions.-A continual challenge for
any compulsory licensing regime is to avoid making distinctions based on
technology. In the case of the compulsory copyright system devised for ca-
ble television and DBS providers (which compete with cable systems), the
different systems have caused mischief over the years, adversely affecting
the DBS providers in the marketplace. In 1998, for example, DBS providers
paid considerably more for programming than their cable rivals, paying an
estimated 57% of the copyright royalties paid by cable while serving 15% of
the customers served by cable.229 Something similar happened with Section
114, which disadvantaged new entrants into the digital radio environment
relative to existing broadcasters and, at least under an early rule, specifically
charged new webcasters a higher rate.
A liability rule that provides advantages based on the form of
technology is both bad competition policy and an invitation for arbitrage.23 °
On the competition policy front, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission
stated the issue effectively in its comments on the compulsory licensing sys-
tem that governs DBS:
in those circumstances in which DBS is a more efficient distribution
technology, a rival technology may have lower costs solely because of
its low-priced access to programming. In such instances, consumers
may not purchase multichannel video programming from a DBS
operator, even though the DBS operator would have been preferred if
the compulsory license applied uniformly. Conversely, if compulsory
licensing were expanded for DBS to place it on equal footing with the
license for other delivery technologies, differences in price among
227. See Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56
(1993) (stating that "[t]hose who petition government for redress are generally immune from
antitrust liability," unless the petitioning is a sham to cover direct interference with a competitor).
228. Both BMI and ASCAP have faced antitrust scrutiny throughout much of their existence.
See, e.g., BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979) (regarding a price-fixing suit filed against BMI and
ASCAP).
229. FCC Satellite Overcarrier Act: Hearing on S. 1422 Before S. Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Eddy W. Harenstein, President, DIRECTV,
Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/212har.pdf.
230. In regulated industries, arbitrage refers to the ability to gain an unfair and irrational
advantage by classifying a similar (or functionally identical) service under a different regulatory
category to gain preferable regulatory treatment.
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distribution technologies would accurately reflect the relative costs of
providing service by alternative means.
231
The ongoing regulatory battles over "intercarrier compensation"
between telecommunications providers (i.e., what rates providers pay one
another for interconnection rights) constitute a case in point in how irrational,
technology-based distinctions create distortions, unfair competitive
advantages, and arbitrage opportunities.232 In particular, the current FCC
rules set different rates that providers must pay one another depending on the
technology used and the type of provider.233 The maze of distinctions in-
cludes whether the networks are wired or wireless; Internet or voice-based;
and long distance or local.234 Because the actual interconnection arrange-
ment is often the same whether or not the particular network delivering the
traffic is any of the above, there is a very powerful incentive to classify traf-
fic in the most advantageous terms, placing service providers who are
required to pay more for interconnection at an unfair competitive
disadvantage.235
The history of copyright law and telecommunications law is rife with
technology-based distinctions that aid certain firms and disadvantage others.
Congress has unfortunately encouraged such rent-seeking behavior, since it
benefits from remaining in control of which firms are favored by regulation
and which are not. Going forward, however, Congress should resist the
temptation to do so and instead follow the antitrust and patent models, which
largely eschew statutory rules based on industry segments.236 In particular,
Congress should structure copyright compulsory licenses based upon the
functional characteristic being regulated-say, reproduction of performed
music-and not favor particular technologies over others.
3. Encourage Private Bargaining.-One of the interesting debates
emerging from the Calabresi and Melamed article is whether negotiations in
the shadow of a liability rule can be an effective means of facilitating win-
23 1. Reply Comments of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 200; see also
Nachbar, supra note 226, at 1375 ("[A]vailability of a preferential, statutory license for existing
technologies is more than likely to forestall the development offuture ones.").
232. For a discussion ofthis issue, see NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 128, at 291-331.
233. Id. at 111-13, 291-93.
234. See id. at 296-306 (discussing differences in rates for Internet and voice-based
technologies); id. at 306-10 (discussing differences in rates for wireless and wired technologies); id.
at 310-30 (discussing differences in rates for long distance and local technologies).
235. Id. at 330-31.
236. We appreciate that this is not entirely true of either patent or antitrust law. See Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1638-39 (2003)
(giving examples of industry-specific patent legislation, and criticizing that approach); see also
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (2000) (providing a statutory exemption from
the antitrust laws). Nonetheless, they are far less industry or technology-specific than copyright or
telecommunications law.
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win solutions.2 37 Property rule advocates believe that property rules are
superior to liability rules because they facilitate bargaining. 238 But others
have challenged that claim. Ayres and Talley, for example, argue that liabil-
ity rules can potentially provide the best of all worlds, serving as a basis for
negotiating in low transaction cost contexts and serving as a check on strate-
gic behavior where negotiations are unlikely to be effective.239 Whether or
not Ayres and Talley are correct (and their argument is subject to a number
of criticisms 240 ), there are undoubtedly cases where a liability rule regime
will give rise to fruitful commercial negotiations. Copyright owners and us-
ers have in the past bargained around the two-cent statutory royalty in section
115 and even around the zero-price liability rule that permits owners of vid-
eos to rent them to others without paying a fee to the copyright owner. As a
consequence, the mere fact that a liability rule system might well be imper-
fect is not necessarily a reason for eschewing such a model. The parties may
be able to bargain in the shadow of that imperfect result.
241
The opportunity to negotiate in the shadow of a liability rule is a critical
benefit that an implementer of a liability rule should appreciate. Thus, to
237. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 590 (2005) (suggesting that liability rules, while potentially undermining ownership stability,
may be helpful in overcoming strategic obstacles to successful negotiations); see also Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104
YALE L.J. 1027, 1031-33 (1995) (arguing that liability rules make possible credible signaling
among entitlement holders about the valuation of an entitlement and that liability rules are market
catalysts). But see Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1303-09 (1996) (arguing that, in the IP
context, property rules are superior to liability rules because the parties can contract out of a
property rule and into a liability rule if need be).
238. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 16-
17 (2006), http://www.nam.org/s_nam/bin.asp?CID=202515&DID=236749&DOC=FILE.PDFO
(recognizing that "[n]o compulsory [license] system could possibly get the right terms on such
complex matters as grant-back licenses, assignments, milestones, trade secrets" and other matters
that cover dozens of pages in many commercial agreements); Merges, supra note 237, at 1303-09
(arguing that property rules, and not liability rules, lead to private bargaining in the IP context).
239. Ayres & Talley, supra note 237, at 1032-33. One form of such behavior that Ayres and
Talley cite is the tendency of a party to overvalue property as a seller and to undervalue it as a
buyer. See id. at 1030 ("Sellers tend to overstate the value they place on the bargained-for item,
while buyers tend to understate their desire to purchase it. As a result of such strategic behavior, the
parties may fail to detect and exploit a mutually beneficial trade, and even when they can it is
usually after considerable and costly delay."). In the face of a judicial remedy, however, parties are
forced to reconsider such positions and thus the possibility of a liability rule-at least on Ayres's
and Talley's account-can increase the likelihood the bargaining will be effective. See id. at 1046
(explaining that the expected damage award "serves as both a ceiling to overstatements and afloor
to understatements"); see also Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
121, 179 (1999) (advocating that "muddy" or imprecise rules should be favored over clear property
rights for online entitlements as a means of inducing privately-ordered solutions).
240. A principal criticism is that they systematically overestimate the competence of courts in
calculating damages. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 12, at 460-62.
241. See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1996) (arguing that the claimed bargaining
advantage of property rules is dubious).
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preserve flexibility, the law should be hesitant to limit sophisticated parties to
the remedies provided by the court or agency.242 In the case of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, the FCC adopted a "pick and
choose" rule that, in effect, punished providers who voluntarily agreed to
arrangements different from the regulatory default rule.243 In particular, the
"pick and choose" rule enabled entrants into the local telephone market to
select certain contractual provisions without adopting others that may have
been the bitter that accompanied the sweet. Consequently, the 1996 Act li-
ability regime did not initially allow for any significant bargaining in the
shadow of a liability rule.
In short, any liability-rule-based regime should recognize the value of
private bargaining and be careful not to discourage it. Regulators or courts
can in some cases affirmatively encourage such behavior by asking the par-
ties to work together to develop sensible liability rules. In the Perfect 10
case, for example, the court did just that, but it is not clear from the court's
order whether that negotiation resulted in the ultimate softening of the prop-
erty rule remedy. 2 " In some cases, regulators or courts can use the system of
"baseball arbitration"-where they commit to picking one of two
proposals-to force parties to provide reasonable terms and conditions (lest
they be forced to accept the more reasonable terms suggested by the
opposing party). At a minimum, however, regulators or courts should not
adopt liability rules that deter voluntary negotiations-as was the case for the
"pick and choose" rules.
4. Searching for True Benchmarks.-We earlier discussed the need for
benchmarks to give courts or regulators confidence in setting royalty rates.
One difficulty with setting liability rules is evaluating whether the purported
benchmark for the set rate is valid. In the webcasting controversy, for
example, the reliance on the RIAA/Yahoo! agreement by the CARP biased
the entire ratemaking proceeding because the example was atypical. In ex-
plaining that particular deal, Mark Cuban, who worked at Yahoo! during the
negotiations, stated that "The Yahoo! deal I worked on... was designed so
that there would be less competition, and so that small webcasters who
needed to live off of a 'percentage-of-revenue' to survive, couldn't., 245 By
242. There may be reasons to restrict the ability of standard form contracts to vary liability
rules, however.
243. See FCC First Report and Order, supra note 128, at 16, 137-42. This interpretation was
subsequently changed to an "all or nothing" rule. See FCC Second Report and Order, Review of the
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 19 F.C.C.R. 13,494,
13,501-07 (July 13, 2004).
244. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 859 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (ordering the parties
to jointly draft a preliminary injunction that balances "intellectual property rights on the one hand
and those promoting access to information on the other").
245. Paul Maloney & Kurt Hanson, Cuban Says Yahoo!'s RIAA Deal Was Designed to Stifle
Competition!, RADIO & INTERNET NEWSL., June 24, 2002, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/
news/062402.
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relying on this agreement, the CARP's determination (even as modified by
the Librarian of Congress) did not reflect a benchmark of what a willing
buyer or seller would pay, but instead reflected "what one grudging
seller ... and one extremely atypical buyer did pay. 246 Unfortunately, the
impact of that decision, even when ameliorated by subsequent congressional
reform, still haunts the webcasting industry, which is far more concentrated
in the United States than in other countries.24 7
The problem of atypical benchmarks is even greater when the
negotiation that provides the benchmark is not one done in a free market but
one done in the shadow of the very liability rule for which the negotiation is
being used. A compulsory licensing system confronts the same pitfall con-
fronted by the FCC in the "pick-and-choose" rule: the system could draw
upon a voluntarily negotiated arrangement as the basis for an industry-wide
arrangement without recognizing the special circumstances that gave rise to
it. In reforming the CARP model, Congress left open this potential pitfall, as
the Copyright Royalty Judges "may consider the rates and terms for
comparable types of [subscription] digital audio transmission services., 248 A
similar problem infects the "reasonable royalty" calculated in patent damages
by means of a hypothetical negotiation between supposedly willing parties.
Those negotiations are driven by the royalty rate the court will set, but the
royalty rate the court will set in turn depends on the outcome of the
negotiations. 249 True benchmarks, by contrast, are negotiated without the
liability rule in mind. If no such agreements exist, courts and regulators must
take special care to collect enough evidence from multiple agreements to be
confident that the benchmarks they use are representative ones.
C. The Relative Advantages of Courts, Agencies, and Standard-Setting
Bodies
Spurred by the development of the Internet as a new distribution
platform and leveler of transaction costs, technology law scholars have begun
to look more seriously and critically at the use of compulsory licenses as part
of IP law. Many of these compulsory licenses do not fit within our core case
for using a liability rule, because they are generally not aimed at a true
holdup scenario and are often developed without a valid pre-existing
246. Id.
247. See Astle, supra note 219, at 178 (noting that after the 2002 CARP determination, the
"number of American webcasters has declined sharply"). As Astle reported, "Arbitron, which
tracks online radio usage, reports that Yahoo! 's Launch.com and AOL's Radio@AOL are by far the
most popular webcasts on the Internet, each accounting for more than four times as many listeners
as Microsoft's MSN Radio, the third-place webcast." Id. at 179.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
249. For more detail on this problem and a mathematical demonstration of how it affects
royalty rates in patent cases, see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 61 (manuscript at 6-8).
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benchmark.250 Nonetheless, as discussed above, they are a common response
to transaction costs and give rise to the fear that incumbent license holders
will not readily provide access to key inputs.
The effort to fine tune compulsory licenses continues to evolve. In
principle, legislative oversight of such measures should evaluate whether
they (1) address a resource for which common access is truly necessary; (2)
develop appropriate arrangements in the face of limited or imperfect
information; and (3) evolve in a dynamic fashion. In developing such
arrangements, Congress should also consider a possible alternative-whether
private institutional arrangements such as collective rights organizations or
standard-setting bodies will be able to manage access to the key IP rights. As
we discuss below, such private alternatives do exist, but, like compulsory
licensing regimes, they are imperfect and, at a minimum, require after-the-
fact oversight by antitrust law.
1. Private Versus Public Agencies in Developing Liability Rules.-In an
important argument, Rob Merges has made the case for property rules on the
ground that, where liability rules are preferable, parties can "contract into
liability rules. 251 In Merges' view, Epstein's Law is justified not only be-
cause courts and agencies are likely to be ineffective in managing a liability
rule regime, but also because private bodies can develop the necessary ex-
pertise to do so.
To Merges, the development of clearinghouses for copyright licenses
like ASCAP and BMI represents a dramatically more effective system of
managing a liability regime than compulsory licensing regimes like the
statutory license created in the wake of the White-Smith case. That license in
particular suffered from what he calls "legislative lock-in"; as Merges
reports, the "two-cent royalty" license adopted in 1909 and codified by stat-
ute remained unchanged until 1978.252 More generally, Merges claims,
privately-developed clearinghouses are likely to have more nuanced regimes
for providing access because "knowledgeable industry participants set the
rules of exchange. 253 As to the setting of rates in Congress, Merges properly
emphasizes-as we outlined above-that there is a considerable risk that
rent-seeking pressures will sway the ultimate outcome.
250. For some of the recent criticism, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and
Associations: Why the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 329-30
(2005) (critiquing compulsory licensing arrangements and praising ingenuity of private ordering);
Smith, supra note 133, at 311 ("Copyright law has a number of statutory compulsory licenses, and
however much sense these might make in a static world, they are very difficult to change once they
are in place.").
251. Merges, supra note 4, at 2655 ("[I]n some cases, the costly bargaining occasioned by a
strong property rule leads to an administrative structure that serves much the same function as a
statutory liability rule."); see also Merges, supra note 237, at 1306-07 (developing this argument).
252. Merges, supra note 237, at 1310.
253. Id. at 1295.
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We are skeptical that Merges's argument makes the cases against ever
using liability rules in IP, for two reasons. First, parties can "contract into"
private liability rules not only from property rules, but also against the back-
drop of government-set liability rules-or the threat of such rules being set.
Indeed, copyright itself includes examples in which parties have agreed to
arrangements rather than rely on government-imposed terms.254 Second, we
believe that Merges's description of ASCAP as an example of an effective
privately ordered solution to a transactions cost problem relies on an overly
rosy picture of how it operates in practice.
We find it significant that Merges downplays the role of antitrust law in
overseeing a collective action solution by would-be competitors. In
particular, he notes only in passing that "antitrust enforcement after 1941 has
appeared to constrain ASCAP somewhat, 255 glossing over the fact that the
consent decree ultimately adopted in the ASCAP antitrust case made a fed-
eral court the final overseer of the organization's pricing structure. This
consent decree required that all license fees be "reasonable" and that an ap-
peal over the reasonableness of the fees could be heard by the consent decree
court, which was authorized to set a reasonable price.256 Thus, as Tim Wu
commented, the relationship of ASCAP and the radio industry "has more in
common with other copyright conflicts than meets the eye" 257-i.e., ASCAP
looks more like a government-regulated compulsory license than an unregu-
lated private endeavor. The commonality, however, ends at an important
point: the antitrust consent decree court has rarely engaged in any price-
setting.258 Nonetheless, the threat of judicial oversight of the relevant rates
may well have simply contributed to a more reasonable bargaining posture
on both sides, thereby facilitating effective bargaining in the shadow of a li-
ability rule. This may well be the best of all worlds.
2. Standard-Setting Bodies as Managers of Holdup Behavior.-A new
version of the "contracting into liability rules" argument is that private
standard-setting bodies can address holdup concerns where they might arise.
254. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Fed'n of Musicians, SoundExchange Reaches Agreement on
Webcasting Rates and Terms, Avoids CARP (Apr. 3, 2003), http://www.afm.org/rcfiles/soundx
040303.htm. A second example involves the Section 115 cover license for music, which is set at a
statutory rate. The Harry Fox Agency charges less than the rate the statute allows it to. See Merges,
supra note 237, at 1310-11 (explaining that the "going rate" including the rate charged by the Harry
Fox Agency, is less than the statutory rate, "in the shadow of the compulsory license").
255. Merges, supra note 237, at 1340.
256. Wu, supra note 43, at 311.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 311 n.137 (reporting that, although rate requests were brought to the consent
decree court, they were settled in advance of any judicial resolution); see also United States v.
ASCAP, 981 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (making a reasonableness determination as to a license
fee request). For an argument that there is no need for a collective rights organization at all, see
Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective
Administration of Performing Rights, I J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 541 (2005).
[Vol. 85:783
2007] Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?
As Doug Lichtman put it, "[flirms interested in implementing heavily pat-
ented [technologies] typically approach the issue by joining together to form
a standard-setting organization, a patent pool, or some other licensing
intermediary. 259 In short, Lichtman posits a paradigm case where a suffi-
cient number of patent holders join together in a standard-setting body and
agree on a limited or perhaps even zero-price royalty for patents necessary to
implement a particular technology standard. As Lichtman argues, "[a]
patentee ihat holds just one of several thousand patents necessary to
implement a given standard does not hold a property right of significant
intrinsic value. 26°
Lichtman's vision of the role of standard-setting bodies is one we are
sympathetic with in theory, and it is true that standard-setting bodies can help
reduce patent holdup problems. Lichtman is incorrect, however, in suggest-
ing that standard-setting organizations (SSOs) "have been relatively
successful at first defining and then enforcing" a commitment to license
necessary technology at a restricted rate.26 1  Rather, as one of us has
explained, there are a variety of standard-setting bodies and their effort to
specify-let alone enforce-licensing commitments is far from a model of
clarity or effectiveness.2 62 It is also inherently limited because parties whose
interests are in maximizing patent revenue will tend not to join such organi-
zations in the first place. To be sure, that does not necessarily mean such
bodies are worse than an agency-developed solution, but we should not de-
lude ourselves into believing that such arrangements are a wholly effective
safeguard against holdup concerns.263 Rather, we should recognize that
"SSOs' incentives to craft and enforce [IP policies] may be imperfectly
aligned with economic efficiency and the protection of end-users against the
effects of patent hold-up. ' 2 6
To appreciate the limits of standard-setting bodies with regard to
addressing holdup concerns, consider the facts of the widely discussed
Rambus case.265 In that case, Rambus participated in the proceedings of the
259. Doug Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process 1 (Univ. of Chi. Law
& Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-902646.
260. Id. at 3.
261. Id. at 11; accord EPSTEIN, supra note 238, at 22-23 (suggesting that standard-setting
bodies represent an entrepreneurial solution that has surmounted the anticommons problem).
262. See Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1889 (2002).
263. Strict adherents to Epstein's Law are prone to making this argument. See Brief of Various
Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 81, at * 18
(suggesting that IP policies of standard-setting bodies constitute an "early warning system" that
"knocks out the holdup problem before it arises").
264. Brief Amicus Curiae of Economics Professors and Scholars at 4, In re Rambus, Inc., No.
9302 (F.T.C. Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/04041 5scholarsamicusbrief.pdf.
265. There have been a series of proceedings related to Rambus, but the two we will focus on
are the patent case decided by the Federal Circuit and the antitrust action decided by the Federal
Trade Commission. See Rambus, Inc., v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In
re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Opinion of the Commission (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006).
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Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) and, at the same time,
continued to prosecute (and amend) patents related to the industry standard
being developed by that body without disclosing that fact to the organization.
As a result, the organization adopted standards not knowing they were or
would ultimately be controlled by Rambus. When Rambus sued JEDEC
members for patent infringement, Infineon counterclaimed, alleging fraud by
Rambus and a violation of the standard-setting body's patent policy. The
trial court ruled for Infineon, holding that JEDEC's patent policy required all
participants to disclose any patents related to the standard and that Rambus
failed to make the required disclosure.26 6 On appeal, however, the Federal
Circuit reversed, concluding that Rambus only needed to disclose patents that
were reasonably necessary to practice the standard and that no patents at is-
sue met that test.26 7
The facts of the Rambus case are controverted and, notwithstanding the
Federal Circuit opinion, the Federal Trade Commission found that Rambus's
behavior violated the antitrust laws.268 At a minimum, however, the case
represents a clear reminder that even reasonably well-organized standard-
setting bodies may fail-for any number of reasons-to restrict the strategic
use of patents. In this case, there is a viable antitrust claim (and a plausible
patent argument) against Rambus because it took part in the relevant
standard-setting body and thus was arguably subject to its policies. But other
cases will surely arise involving parties not subject to a standard-setting
body's IP policies and thus will be in an unimpeded position from seeking to
extract premium royalties by threatening an injunction.269 Indeed, patent
owners may choose not to join standard-setting organizations precisely to
avoid the effect of any such collective licensing policies.
Finally, we should note that, even where standard-setting bodies are
theoretically able to enforce their front-end restrictions on the use of IP
rights, there is no guarantee that those restrictions will be effective in
practice. In particular, there are some unresolved questions related to
whether a front-end commitment to license IP rights at "reasonable and non-
266. Rambus, Inc. v. Infmeon Techns. AG, 164 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750-65 (E.D. Va. 2001).
267. Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1100 ("Thus, Rambus's duty to disclose extended only to claims in
patents or applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard."). Judge Prost
dissented, finding that Rambus had committed fraud by violating its disclosure obligations to
JEDEC. Id. at 1107 (Prost, J., dissenting).
268. The FTC found monopolization in a detailed opinion. See In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302,
Opinion of the Commission, at 72-74 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006). Notably, the remedy it ordered was a
compulsory license of Rambus's patents at a rate that approximates what they could have been
licensed for absent holdup. Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Final Opinion and Order in Rambus
Matter (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/070502rambus.htm
269. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One
Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 154 (2007) (arguing that, because standard setting involves the
creation of irreversible investments, patent owners who are not subject to the standard-setting
body's policies can threaten an injunction and thereby "demand sums of money that are far out of
proportion to the actual inventive contribution that they have made").
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discriminatory" (RAND) terms will be implemented effectively. Some
commentators, for example, suggest that parties subject to a RAND require-
ment will still be able to "unilaterally impose onerous license terms at that
'ex post' stage," exercising "artificially created seller market power [on
account of a locked-in standard] that adversely affects consumer interests
generally., 270  We do not agree with this argument, 271 but our point is that
commentators should not mistake the ability of standard-setting bodies to
develop IP policies with the ability to effectively prevent holdup in practice.
Consequently, although SSO policies are an important tool in safeguarding
holdup, it is not accurate to suggest that they render other measures by courts
or agencies wholly unnecessary. And for many of the issues we have identi-
fied in this paper, including copyright and telecommunications law, even the
partial solution of private standard-setting may be unavailable.
3. The Comparative Advantages of Courts and Agencies.-As
copyright law in particular or technology law more generally opts for liability
rules that are not easily administrable by courts, scholars must engage in a
more careful assessment of comparative institutional competence. Indeed,
Calabresi and Melamed, while acknowledging this issue, failed to highlight
its significance.272 So too have others who followed them.273 In their sole
discussion of the institutional competence issue, Calabresi and Melamed
concede that courts might not be well suited to administer certain types of
liability rules-in particular the novel rule four that calls for a firm harmed
by the relevant conduct to pay a fee to buy off the party causing the harm.274
As to rule four, Calabresi and Melamed suggested that the associated chal-
270. Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potentialfor Addressing the Patent Holdup
Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 728 (2005).
271. See Lemley, supra note 262, at 1923-27 (arguing that a commitment to a RAND royalty
should be deemed a license, with the court to set the license price in case of dispute); Joseph Scott
Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm,
40 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 33), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cftn?abstract-id=924883 (asserting that a RAND promise eliminates the prospect of
injunctive relief).
272. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1116, 1122-23 (identifying the issue of
institutional competency, noting that rule four does not often lend itself to judicial imposition and
that the assessments needed to implement rule four are more easily made by alternative institutions
or political bodies).
273. A notable exception to the tendency to downplay institutional competence issues is Krier
& Schwab, supra note 12, at 475-77, which examines the role of legislative and administrative
bodies-i.e., through paying out subsidies or collecting taxes-in overcoming the difficulty of
judicial implementation of rule four.
274. Calabresi and Melamed's novel rule four was presented as a hypothetical possibility in
their article. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1120. Ironically, as the article was going to
press, a court in Arizona devised just such a remedy, concluding that a development would have to
pay the owners of a large feedlot the costs that it would incur to move because the development had
"come to the nuisance." See Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 707-08
(Ariz. 1972).
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lenges of assessing damages points towards a reliance on political bodies to
make the sort of judgments that are typical of eminent domain cases.275
The increasing complexity of IP and technology law requires that
technology lawyers and scholars adopt a broad perspective on the availability
of different remedial strategies and institutional solutions.276 In eBay v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., Chief Justice Roberts adopted the traditional view in
explaining that the "long tradition of equity practice" in favor of injunctions
"is not surprising, given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through
monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the
patentee's wishes-a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of
the traditional four-factor test. 277 Chief Justice Roberts's point will often be
valid, but not always. In some cases, a viable benchmark is available to set
an appropriate license fee. In other cases, even an imperfect license ar-
rangement set by a court is superior to a "market" arrangement born of a
holdup scenario. In yet other contexts, including interconnection rights in
telecommunications or de minimis infringement scenarios (such as some
cybertrespass cases, cases involving open wireless networks, and, quite
possibly, Perfect 10), a zero-price liability rule providing free access may
maximize social welfare by avoiding both the holdup and license-calculation
problems. Finally, problems with judicial competence do not necessarily
doom a liability rule approach, as there may be certain contexts (such as
leased access to an incumbent telephone company's local loops) where an
agency can be called upon to develop and enforce the necessary access ar-
rangements.
Ultimately, policymakers must evaluate the comparative costs and
benefits of relying on a property rule regime enforced by courts and accom-
panied by antitrust oversight against a liability rule regime superintended
either by courts or agencies. Unfortunately, however, most technology cases
are analyzed without a larger appreciation for their institutional context.
Similarly, in praising private arrangements like collective rights organiza-
tions or standard-setting bodies, some commentators play down the costs and
challenges of ongoing antitrust oversight. Part of the challenge in comparing
different institutional strategies is that a one-size-fits-all approach-say,
Epstein's law-is unlikely to be correct. Consequently, the best strategy is
one that calls for sensitivity to the individual context, empowers courts to use
liability rules where they can do so effectively, relies on private organiza-
tions where they are able to develop effective access opportunities, and uses
275. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1122.
276. For a recent article recognizing this point, see Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83
N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004), which examines the shift from a property rights model to a regulatory
model in the area of copyright law.
277. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
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agencies to manage more complex liability regimes where private efforts are
either unlikely to succeed or will be riddled with their own challenges.
VI. Conclusion
Epstein's Law is appealing if one believes that policymakers are
institutionally incapable of evaluating the different strategies necessary to
make liability rules work. But all advantages are comparative, and reflexive
reliance on property rules can create real problems in a range of IP,
telecommunications, and Internet cases. Unfortunately, courts, agencies, and
Congress often make such decisions without appreciating their larger
context.
As an initial matter, we believe that courts should recognize that there
are core cases where they can and should superintend liability rules
effectively. Notably, there are a set of cases where the nature of the property
right itself gives rise to a holdup problem because an injunction cannot be
tailored to limit only infringing conduct and where a reasonable benchmark
exists to guide the court on an appropriate remedy (or a zero-priced access
rule is justified). In some cases (such as interconnection between
telecommunications networks and managing spectrum interference), courts
will not be well situated to superintend a remedy and may well need to rely
on (or defer to) agencies. In yet other cases, the decision on the appropriate
institutional strategy will be a hard question and Congress may well need to
monitor and evaluate which strategy is appropriate.
Going forward, there is a pressing need for scholars to evaluate the
choice between liability rules and property rules within a larger institutional
context and develop a greater appreciation for the relevant costs and benefits
of different options. In identifying core cases where one regime or another is
most effective, scholars can isolate the hardest cases where closer empirical
investigation is necessary. In our view, the holdup scenario that can arise in
patent, copyright, and telecommunications regulation clearly justifies a case-
specific liability rule that can be superintended effectively by courts in most
cases and by agencies in others. By contrast, we see the development of
more general compulsory licenses as a more complex question. There, the
clearest need is for a more effective institutional strategy to implement li-
ability rules and a more careful investigation as to how such regimes fare
when compared to those managed by collective rights organizations or
standard-setting bodies.
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